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ABSTRACT
The U.S. class action regime is supposed to obtain justice for victims
and hold wrongdoers accountable. Instead, the system is filled with
pathologies that combine to harm class members and allow defendants to
minimize their responsibility. Victims are deprived of their property and
due process rights. Adding insult to injury, the modern movement towards
cy pres settlements also deprives victims of their free speech rights. Cy
pres was borrowed from the law of trusts, but its use in class actions is
unjustified. It is leading to greater corruption and collusion, opening the
door to significant rent seeking. Most reform proposals will not help, but
two—adopting an opt-in regime and using a corporate form—hold
significant promise.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Justice, like democracy, “must be something more than two wolves and
a sheep voting on what to have for dinner.”1 Individuals must have a
meaningful say in how they fit within a just society, and the justice system
must preserve the integrity of the individual. Our class action system is
filled with significant tradeoffs and tensions between social goals and
individual justice.2 This is well recognized in both economics and legal
literature, but outside of a small group of corporate law scholars,3 the role
of misaligned incentives between client and lawyer is ignored. That
misalignment is common in all legal representation4 but is more pronounced in
class actions because the vast majority of clients will never know they are
clients, much less adequately monitor the performance of their agent, the
lawyer.5
This Article analyzes a recent trend in class action lawsuits—the
introduction of cy pres awards and cy pres-only settlements.6 This trend
exacerbates each of the principal-agent problems created by our class
action system and gives rise to new concerns, posing a serious threat to
the rule of law and to the rights of individual plaintiffs.7 This Article
tackles the threat by framing it in two parallel ways. First, in economic

1. JAMES BOVARD, LOST RIGHTS: THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICAN LIBERTY 333
(1994). Although a variation on this quote is often attributed to Benjamin Franklin, there
is no record of it in his known writings.
2. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief
and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62
F LA. L. R EV . 617, 618–20 (2010) (describing the tension between social goals of
deterrence and individual remedies to victims).
3. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice,
and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000); Samuel
Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV.
337 (1999).
4. E.g., Paul Harzen Beach, The Parens Patriae Settlement Auction, 52 GONZ. L.
REV. 455, 457 (2017) (“[T]here are problems at the ‘back-end’ of the litigation—the
current private attorney general model misaligns the incentives of private attorneys and
the public they represent . . . .”).
5. See infra Section II.2.
6. E.g., In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252, 1254 (7th Cir. 1984)
(“[I]t was appropriate for the district court to consider the cy pres doctrine or Fluid Class
Recovery to achieve an equitable disposition of the reserve fund.”).
7. See infra Section III.C.
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terms, as an opportunity for judicial rent seeking.8 Second, in legal terms,
as a deprivation of due process and First Amendment rights.9
The underlying incentives for class counsel and defendants to collude
at the expense of absent class members perverts principles of justice in an
effort to generate extra-market returns. Those returns accrue to both class
counsel—higher fees from inattentive clients10—and defendants—resolving
legal claims at a steep discount.11 That collusion deprives absent class
members of their legitimate legal claims without meaningful consent, violating
due process.12 When cy pres awards and cy pres-only settlements are
used, the incentives of client and lawyer fall further out of alignment and
absent class members are forced to speak in the voice of the charitable
organizations that receive cy pres funds, violating class members’ First
Amendment right to free speech.13
Foundational to the arguments herein is the principle that individual
rights—not notions of collective or social justice14—are protected through
our system of civil law. Even when those rights are pursued in an aggregated
form, such as class action lawsuits, they remain personal to the individual.15
Section II summarizes the extensive literature on the law and economics
8. The concept of “rent seeking,” or expenditure of resources in pursuit of special,
non-market advantages, was pioneered by the late Gordon Tullock in connection with his
work on regulatory agencies. Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies,
and Theft, 7 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967). The term “rent seeking” was coined by economist Anne
Kreuger a decade later. Anne O. Kreuger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking
Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974). Rent seeking enters the judiciary as litigants seek
more than mere compensation for wrongs suffered—rather, windfalls not available through
traditional market behavior. Jeremy Kidd, Modeling the Likely Effects of Litigation
Financing, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1239, 1266–67 (2016).
9. See Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 2, at 645–46.
10. See infra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
12. Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 2, at 645.
13. See infra Section III.C.1.
14. In recent years, there has been a greater focus on the need for something called
“collective justice,” e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Continuing Tensions in the Resolution of Mass
Toxic Harm Cases: A Comment, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1037, 1040 (1995) (describing the
“tension between our continuing impulse to do individual justice and a more modern
compensation-driven conception of collective justice”) (emphasis omitted), or social
justice, e.g., Stephanie M. Wildman, Democracy and Social Justice: Founding Centers for
Social Justice in Law Schools, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 252, 252 (2005) (“Protecting democracy
by combating inequality is the task of social justice lawyers.”), both of which choose a
fundamentally different path—although possibly with similar goals in mind—than the
individual protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir.
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (“The personal
jurisdiction requirement [from the Due Process Clause] recognizes and protects an individual
liberty interest.”).
15. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1014 (2d Cir. 1973) (“[T]he
claims of many may not be treated collectively or as ‘the class as a whole’ . . . .”).
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of class action lawsuits, with emphasis on the incentives for rent seeking.
Professors David Rosenberg and Kathryn E. Spier have proposed a formal
model to demonstrate the efficiency of the class action mechanism,16 but
the model, like most analyses of class action lawsuits, mistakenly assumes
only two parties. Even setting aside the possibility that class members might
not be uniform in their desired ends,17 the interests of class members and
class counsel will often diverge. Any formal model of class action lawsuits
must consider the incentives of all three parties to the action: (1) the
defendant; (2) the class; and (3) class counsel.18 Once adjusted to reflect
this reality, class actions look far less promising.
Section III addresses how cy pres awards and cy pres-only settlements
cause additional divergence between the incentives of class members and
those of class counsel. As that divergence occurs, the incentives of class
counsel drift not only away from those of the class but also directly
towards those of defendants.19 As defendants and class counsel have more
closely aligned incentives, greater rent seeking will occur at the expense
of the class.20 Section IV then discusses how these issues came to prominence
in Frank v. Gaos,21 decided by the United States Supreme Court on March
20, 2019.22 Frank is important for two primary reasons: first, because it
helps to define the trend in the class action realm towards greater abuse of
the process and of class members;23 and second, because the Court’s response
to the facts clearly illustrates several problems inherent in cy pres class
actions.24

16. See generally David Rosenberg & Kathryn E. Spier, Incentives to Invest in
Litigation and the Superiority of the Class Action, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 305 (2014).
17. See infra Section III.C.1.
18. A model purporting to reflect likely outcomes of a decision matrix should
represent all individuals capable of making independent choices. E.g., Kidd, supra note
8, at 1246–54 (2016) (supplementing the classic NEV lawsuit model for litigation funding
with analysis of the funder, who makes an independent choice on funding). Class counsel
are not fully constrained by their ethical obligations to their clients, the class members, see
infra Section II.B., and so must be considered independent actors.
19. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Section III.D.
21. Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041 (2019).
22. Id. at 1041.
23. See Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Justices Sidestep Decision on Propriety
of “Cy pres” Class-Action Settlements, SCOTUSB LOG (Mar. 20, 2019, 5:37 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/03/opinion-analysis-justices-sidestep-decision-onpropriety-of-cy-pres-class-action-settlements/ [https://perma.cc/SJK2-RG3B].
24. See id.
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Section V then identifies possible solutions in a more nuanced way than
is often the case. All class action lawsuits are not the same, and courts
should have a range of possible tools. One proposed solution expressly
tested is using the unique features of the corporate form to discipline
agents through application of fiduciary duties to class counsel. Professor
Amanda M. Rose has advanced proposals along these lines,25 and those
proposals will be assessed.
II. THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY OF CLASS
ACTION LAWSUITS
A. The Good
The modern class action was an efficient way to facilitate enforcement
of substantive rights.26 Aggregate litigation of this sort appears to run
counter to the foundational principles of a system designed to protect
individual rights, but minimal scrutiny reveals that certain categories of
individual rights cannot be defended in court without aggregation. The
reason is simple—litigation is costly, and a lawsuit that is more costly than it
is valuable is unlikely to be brought, at least if considered individually.
In one sense, the choice to sue is a straightforward application of
economic principles. An individual who has been wronged must evaluate
the magnitude of the injury to be corrected, the likelihood of success, and
the cost of concluding the lawsuit—settlement or judgment—and measure
that against the benefits to be achieved from that conclusion. If there is a
reasonable expectation that the lawsuit will yield a positive result,27 the
victim is likely to sue; if the expected outcome is negative,28 no lawsuit
will be filed.
Low-value claims and complex claims are less likely to be brought by
an individual victim—the former because the anticipated benefits are low
and the latter because the anticipated costs are high. From the perspective

25. See generally Amanda M. Rose, Cutting Class Action Agency Costs: Lessons
from the Public Company, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 337 (2020) [hereinafter Agency Costs];
Amanda M. Rose, Classaction.gov, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (2021) [hereinafter Classaction.gov].
26. Robert G. Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits: Parsing the Debates Over
Ascertainability and Cy Pres, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 913, 913 (2017); see also Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979) (“[T]he class-action device saves the resources of
both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every [class
member] to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23.”).
27. In mathematical terms: ∑𝑛𝑖 𝑝𝑖 𝑥𝑖 − 𝐶 > 0, where C is the cost of obtaining a
judgment, xi is a potential judgment, and pi is the probability of that judgment being
achieved.
28. ∑𝑛𝑖 𝑝𝑖 𝑥𝑖 − 𝐶 < 0. For an example of how these mathematical equations are
used in formal modeling, see Kidd, supra note 8, at 1245–49.
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of the individual, our legal system should provide a means of recourse for
those who have been legitimately harmed. From the perspective of society,
however, it is difficult, a priori, to know whether society should react to
this with regret or relief. If the claim has limited recovery potential for
the individual and will require the expenditure of more resources to
prosecute, society might be better off letting the harm lay where it falls.
Even if the potential rewards are high, society might prefer the claim not
be brought if the costs of prosecuting the case would be higher than the
benefit. Avoiding these claims leaves the victim without redress and might
incentivize further wrongdoing,29 but it also avoids high costs of prosecution.
If the claims being avoided arise out of unique or highly unlikely
circumstances, there is likely little to be done to align the interests of the
victim with those of society; the societal costs will simply outweigh any
individual benefit.30 If the injury-causing circumstances are more common,
however, aggregating claims might increase total benefits faster than
costs.31 At some point, the total benefit from litigation will be greater than
the total cost, and individual choices to eschew litigation will no longer
be socially optimal.32 For example, if a property owner’s refusing to properly
maintain the premises leads to a continuous stream of small value injuries,
each victim will find it unprofitable to employ a lawyer to seek redress,
but society would prefer a lawsuit that would force the owner to properly
maintain the property and stop present and future harms.
There may be positive spillovers that arise out of litigation, in that
enforcement of individual rights leads to avoidance of future harms to
third parties. Because the individual victim does not capture those benefits,
they are far less likely to sue.33 One possible way to resolve this inefficiency
is the Pigouvian34 method of subsidizing activities with positive externalities,
29. See, e.g., id. at 1255.
30. If the individual rights being defended are viewed as socially valuable, this may
change the calculation and result in a net positive social value for the claim.
31. In economic parlance, litigation might exhibit decreasing per-claim costs, also
known as economies of scale. See David R. Henderson, Natural Monopoly, LIBR . OF
ECON. & LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Monopoly.html [https://perma.cc/
5RQJ-G58Y].
32. See Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Class Actions and Class Action Waivers, 23
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 305, 327–28 (2015) (describing the freerider problem in individual
litigation and the costs it imposes on society).
33. In technical economic terms, the lawsuit would demonstrate a positive externality.
See Bryan Caplan, Externalities, LIBR . OF ECON. & LIBERTY , http://www.econlib.org/
library/Enc/Externality.html [https://perma.cc/GQ4A-XTMN].
34. See ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932).
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but paying individuals to sue raises a host of additional concerns. Instead,
society has allowed aggregation of claims, hoping economies of scale can
be exploited,35 bringing down per-claim costs and allowing more beneficial
claims to be brought.36
Class actions are also thought to correct an imbalance for defendants.37
According to this argument, well-heeled defendants can outlast poor
plaintiffs and avoid liability for wrongs committed by simply waiting until
plaintiffs run out of funds or patience and drop a lawsuit.38 A credible
threat to delay resolution long enough for it to have a negative expected
value might convince a plaintiff to settle for a fraction of the legitimate
value of a valid legal claim. The ability to make that credible threat declines
when similar claims are aggregated, since the defendant would bear the
full cost of delay, but each plaintiff would bear only a portion.
Finally, class actions have been justified on cost-efficiency grounds. In
the 1980s, class actions were viewed as a solution to an increasing strain
on judicial resources,39 allowing similar claims to be resolved with a single
process.40 The structure of Rule 23,41 particularly the commonality and
numerosity requirements, support these efficiency justifications for class
actions.42 Rather than expend limited judicial resources on relitigating
common questions of law and fact from individual but related lawsuits, a
court could save time and resources by offering one binding set of legal

35.
36.

See Henderson, supra note 31.
H ENRY N. BUTLER , C HRISTOPHER R. D RAHOZAL & J OANNA S HEPHERD ,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 172 (3d ed. 2014) (“[Class actions] may permit
plaintiffs to achieve economies of scale in litigating their case and thus reduce litigation
costs. . . . [A]ggregating the claims into a class action may be the only way to make the
suit economical to bring . . . .”). Some commentators viewed the adoption of Rule 23 in
1966 as an improvement because it would lead to greater numbers of class actions. See
Charles Alan Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 170 (1970) (describing Rule 23 as “a
bold and well-intentioned attempt to encourage more frequent use of class actions”).
37. E.g., Joshua D. Blank & Eric A. Zacks, Dismissing the Class: A Practical
Approach to the Class Action Restriction on the Legal Services Corporation, 110 PENN
ST. L. REV. 1, 12 (2005).
38. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions
in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1906 (2002) (“In
general, the unequal investment incentives for defendants and plaintiffs in mass tort cases
translate into a greater chance that, in litigating common questions, defendants will prevail.”).
39. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729,
736 (2013).
40. See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986)
(“[C]ourts are now being forced to rethink the alternatives and priorities by the current
volume of litigation and more frequent mass disasters.”). In Raymark, the court noted that
the district court’s plan for a class action was “clearly superior to the alternative of repeating,
hundreds of times over, the litigation of the [same legal and factual disputes].” Id.
41. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
42. See id. 23(a)(1)–(2).
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and factual conclusions.43 This would free up judicial resources for other
legal claims.
This focus on efficiency gains from class actions is useful as a way of
measuring the net effect on society of choosing an aggregate enforcement
policy, but it also partially obscures the primary purpose of our judicial
system—the enforcement of individual rights. In promoting efficiency,
class actions do have the potential to protect individual rights, allowing
small value claims to be brought in aggregate form and freeing up resources
so additional claims can be considered that might never have been heard
if class actions had not consolidated multiple related cases. However, the
two rationales should be kept separate because, as discussed in the next
section, there are reasons to suspect that each justification for class action
lawsuits is weaker than acknowledged by proponents of our system.
B. The Bad
The tradeoff of aggregating claims into a class action is a misalignment
of incentives between lawyer and client44—a misalignment that, admittedly,
exists to a greater or lesser extent in every case of legal representation.
The lawyer acts as the agent of the client, indicating that the lawyer-client
relationship will be subject to standard principal-agent problems.45 Clients
are typically unsophisticated in the law and are, therefore, incapable of
adequately monitoring their agent’s behavior, thus freeing up the lawyer
to engage in self-dealing.46 Lawyers are governed by fiduciary standards
regarding their clients, and professional standards also act as a counterbalance
to the incentive to shirk or extract additional benefits from the client.47 A
client can sue to recover damages resulting from lawyer self-dealing and
violations of professional standards can, theoretically, be punished severely,
impairing a lawyer’s ability to practice law. However, these punishments

43. See id. 23(b)(3).
44. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform,
62 IND. L. J. 625, 628 (1987) (“It is no secret that substantial conflicts of interest can arise
in class action litigation between attorney and client.”).
45. E.g., W. Bradley Wendel, The Problem of the Faithless Principal: Fiduciary
Theory and the Capacities of Clients, 124 PENN ST. L. REV. 107, 113 (2019).
46. Id. at 112.
47. Id. For example, a lawyer might overstate the costs of a lawsuit or work actually
done on the case, extracting additional fees from the client.
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can only come after detection and enforcement proceedings, so the lawyer
will be only imperfectly deterred.48
Aggregating many claims in a class action amplifies these principalagent problems, largely by further distancing the lawyer from each individual
plaintiff. Given the large number of class members, the lawyer-client
relationship becomes subject to the standard rent-seeking problem of
concentrated benefits and dispersed costs.49 The value of the aggregated
claims will be divided between the defendant, class counsel, and the class.
If class counsel extracts a larger amount, x, from the joint pool, class
counsel will see its well-being
rise by x while each class member will see
𝑥
a decline in well-being of 𝑛, where n is the number of individuals in the
class.50 As the size of the class rises, the incentive for any class member
to pay attention to increasingly smaller reductions in payout decreases,51
and class counsel can extract additional resources from the pool. For many
lawyers, fiduciary obligations and rules of professional conduct will maintain
self-government, but the imperfect deterrence for traditional lawyer-client
relationships is even further degraded because each member of the class
has even less incentive to effectively monitor lawyer behavior, given positive
spillovers from enforcement.52
There are strong reasons to suspect that rent seeking by class counsel
will occur any time claims are aggregated, with an increasing class size
raising the rewards of rent seeking. That would be true even in an opt-in
class action, where each member of the class had affirmatively chosen to
be part of the class.53 The opportunities for rent seeking only get worse
in an opt-out system, wherein members of the class are presumed to be
members of the class unless they affirmatively opt-out. The United States
class action system has been an opt-out system since 1985, when the
Supreme Court concluded that requiring class actions to be opt-in would
48. See generally Tom Baker, Alon Harel & Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of Uncertainty
in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443 (2004) (explaining the impact
of uncertain detection and uncertain punishment on the incentives for misbehavior).
49. See Daniel A. Lyons, Public Use, Public Choice, and the Urban Growth Machine:
Competing Political Economies of Takings Law, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 265, 277 (2009).
50. In a pro rata settlement, money in a class action lawsuit is divided by splitting
the amount equally among the class members. See Christina Davis, How Is Money Divided
in a Class Action Lawsuit?, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Dec. 19, 2020), https://topclassactions.com/
faqs/how-is-money-divided-in-a-class-action-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/Z46N-R8YJ].
51. Keith N. Hylton, Deterrence and Aggregate Litigation 2 (Bos. Univ. Sch. L.,
Law & Econ. Paper No. 17-45, 2018).
52. See Hylton, supra note 32, at 327–28 (describing the free rider problem in class
actions).
53. In that case, the simple attorney-client relationship—complete with all its “pathologies”
—would be enough to result in self-dealing, see Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L.
REV. 31, 59 (2017), with incentives for rent seeking rising with the size of the potential
judgment.
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result in too few legitimate class actions being brought.54 Given the lower
cost of class creation under an opt-out system, and notwithstanding the
additional opportunities for rent seeking, described below, opt-out class
actions became the rule in U.S. courts in the wake of Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts.
In an opt-out system, most members of the class will not even know
that they are members. While class counsel must obtain consent of class
members,55 that consent can be obtained by sending notice to as many
class members as feasible and including every class member who does not
affirmatively object to inclusion.56 Because a larger class means a larger
pool from which to draw rents, class counsel have an incentive to make
the pool larger. Class notices are often indistinguishable from junk mail,
often comprising nothing more than a post card with complicated legal
language.57 Unsophisticated potential class members will likely not recognize
the notice, throw it away, and be swept up into the class without having
given meaningful consent. These class members will obviously be far less
likely to object to self-dealing by class counsel because they do not realize
class counsel is acting on their behalf.58
Defendants will also have an incentive to engage in rent seeking. As a
general proposition, this is unsurprising because all defendants would
prefer not to pay any damages, maintaining the value of the lawsuit for
themselves. With a class action lawsuit, however, the risks of loss are
augmented, given the high value of the aggregated claims. Once the class
is certified, defendants have a strong incentive to settle in “blackmail
settlements.”59 Once the decision to settle has been made, defendants will
54. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812–13 (1985) (“Requiring a
plaintiff to affirmatively request inclusion [in the class] would . . . impede the prosecution
of those class actions involving an aggregation of small individual claims . . . .”). The
authors of the 1966 revisions to FED. R. CIV. P. 23 understood that they were expanding
class actions to make an opt-out regime possible. See Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note
2, at 630.
55. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812.
56. See generally, e.g., Marin v. Comenity Bank, L.L.C., No. 16-CV-0737, 2017
WL 3670030 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2017) (holding that class member was part of class
because she could not prove she returned the opt-out notice).
57. See, e.g., id. at *1, *3 (holding that generic postcards were sufficient even if the
class member never received the postcard).
58. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1010 (2d Cir. 1973)
(“[I]t is quite apparent that some of the original 6,000,000 claimants will . . . have never
heard of the case . . . .”).
59. Klonoff, supra note 39, at 741–42.
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still engage in rent seeking, attempting to keep as much of the pool for
themselves. In doing so, there will be strong incentives for class counsel
and defendants to collude, depriving class members of the value of their
claims.
Class counsel wish to maximize their fee award while minimizing the
work needed to achieve it.60 Defendants wish to minimize the damages
paid while maximizing the total claims disposed of by the settlement.61
Both goals can be achieved, through collusion, by increasing the size of
the class while steeply discounting the value given for each claim settled.62
By stretching the definition of the class to the point of breaking, the total
value of the class action is high—justifying a high fee award—but at a
fraction of the potential value of the claims actually disposed of. This
happens at the direct expense of individual class members, who receive
pennies on the dollar, coupons for future goods or services from the
defendant, 63 or even nothing.64
The strong incentives for class counsel and defendants to rent seek at
the expense of the class also weakens the arguments for class actions,
generally. Individual class members’ victimization at the hands of defendants
are compounded with exploitation at the hands of the lawyers responsible
for protecting them. Exploitative collusion between defendants and class
counsel also undermines efficiency arguments for the class action mechanism.
From a practical perspective, changes to class action rules have dramatically
raised the burden on the judicial system by multiplying class action lawsuits.65
Class action lawsuits also provide minimal deterrence because defendants
get to use class action settlements as a way of increasing profits.66 Finally,
60. See Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 785 (7th Cir. 2004).
61. See id. This is the converse of the class counsel’s problem, with the defendant
seeking to incur the least cost—damages paid—while maximizing the benefit—total value
of potential claims disposed of.
62. See id. (“Would it be too cynical to speculate that what may be going on here
is that class counsel wanted a settlement that would give them a generous fee and Fleet
wanted a settlement that would extinguish 1.4 million claims against it at no cost to
itself?”).
63. E.g., In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig., 716 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting a
settlement in which the class received coupons for printer and printer services purchased
from the defendant).
64. See infra Section III.C.
65. See Bonanno v. Quizno’s Franchise Co., No. 06-CV-02358-CMA-KLM, 2009
WL 1068744, at *10 (D. Colo. April 20, 2009) (“The most critical step in the evolution of
class litigation came in 1966, when . . . the Committee sought to make the class action rule
more ‘practical’ for courts and parties. By doing so, it ushered in the era of widespread
use of class actions in American courts.” (citation omitted)).
66. A sophisticated defendant will understand that low-value injuries will be
disposed of at a fraction of the value of the actual injury. Each injury inflicted will therefore
add to the defendant’s bottom line.
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the need for high total class value will lead class counsel to include purely
mala prohibita claims that plaintiffs would never have brought.67 Combined
or in isolation, these factors mean that class actions are likely a burden on
the judiciary and a drag on efficiency.
C. The Ugly
Class action lawsuits have always been a second-best solution, given
the costs of defending individual legal rights.68 Group litigation, an early
analog of the modern class action, allowed a representative of rural and town
groups to enforce the equitable rights of the group’s members in English
courts.69 The aggregated form was necessary, given transportation and
communication constraints of the day, 70 but the rights of individual
plaintiffs were protected by the fact that the rights of all represented
plaintiffs had to be identical and the ability of a tight-knit group to police
any self-dealing.71
Over time, the desire to increase the availability of class actions has led
to rule changes with that end in mind, at least initially with the goal of
protecting the rights of individuals.72 In 1842, the Supreme Court promulgated
Equity Rule 48,73 which “officially recognized representative suits where
the parties were too numerous to be conveniently brought before the court,

67. See, e.g., Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 237 (9th Cir. 1974)
(Duniway, J., concurring) (“Yet the plaintiffs seek to parlay their claim into a lawsuit on
behalf of 400,000 sellers, not one of whom, so far as we are advised, except the Sherman
plaintiffs, has indicated the slightest interest in suing anyone.”).
68. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948)
(“The class action was an invention of equity, mothered by the practical necessity of
providing a procedural device so that mere numbers would not disable large groups of
individuals, united in interest, from enforcing their equitable rights . . . .” (citation omitted)).
69. Howard M. Downs, Federal Class Actions: Due Process by Adequacy of
Representation (Identity of Claims) and the Impact of General Telephone v. Falcon, 54
OHIO ST. L. J. 607, 612–13 (1993).
70. See, e.g., Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a
History of the Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866, 877 (1977).
71. Downs, supra note 69, at 613; see also FREDERIC CALVERT, A TREATISE UPON
THE LAW RESPECTING PARTIES TO SUITS IN EQUITY 19–20 (1837) (describing the formal
and informal structures of mass litigation at that time).
72. In West v. Randall, Justice Story argued for the importance of having all parties
with interests involved in the case, “however numerous they may be.” West v. Randall,
29 F. Cas. 718, 721 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 17,424). The reason was so that, in part, there
would be “no injustice . . . done” to absent parties with interests in the claim. Id.
73. FED. EQUITY R. 48 (1842) (repealed 1912).
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but refused to bind absent parties to any judgment.” 74 Protections for
absent parties slipped in 1912, when Equity Rule 48 was replaced with
Equity Rule 38,75 which allowed absent parties to be bound by a court’s
rulings.76 The ugly truth about class actions is that, beginning with Equity
Rule 38, the principle that aggregate litigation should preserve individual
rights began to be subsumed in the desire to achieve mass justice.77
When the original version of Rule 23 was adopted in 1938,78 it was
intended to be a “substantial restatement” of Equity Rule 38,79 but it went
further, extending the class action regime to all civil claims, whether legal
or equitable.80 Some courts even seemed to wish it would go further,
warning against inhibiting class actions by “load[ing them] down with
arbitrary and technical restrictions.”81 The 1966 amendments to Rule 23
were intended to facilitate an even greater number of class actions82 and
purported to preserve the rights of absent class members.83
Expansion of class actions is not inherently bad, although it does increase
the likelihood that the costs will outweigh the benefits. Each change, from
Equity Rule 38 on, can be viewed as a course correction intended to bring
the class action regime in closer alignment with its potential. Inevitably,
however, each effort has failed, and judicial rent seeking persists within
the class action realm. The inclusion of numerosity and commonality
requirements in Rule 23, for example, was intended to limit class actions
to those where efficiency gains would be the highest,84 yet efficiency gains
have been outweighed by the high costs of rent seeking.
74. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 804 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992).
75. FED. EQUITY R. 38 (1912) (repealed 1938).
76. See id.
77. Cf. Martin H. Redish, Rethinking the Theory of the Class Action: The Risks and
Rewards of Capitalistic Socialism in the Litigation Process, 64 EMORY L.J. 451, 456
(2014) (“It was, then, not until the promulgation of the modern form of Rule 23 in 1966
that our procedural system included a device that allowed representative parties to bind
absent class members when their rights possessed no prelitigation substantive link.”).
78. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1938).
79. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) advisory committee’s note to 1937 amendment.
80. 7 CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1752 (3d ed. 2005). Group litigation began as a way of
enforcing aggregate equitable claims only. Yeazell, supra note 70, at 888.
81. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948).
82. See, e.g., Charles Donelan, Prerequisites to a Class Action Under New Rule 23,
10 B.C. L. REV. 527, 528 (1969) (“Prior to amended Rule 23, there was no ready
accommodation in the Federal Rules for the interests of the small claimant or effective
means of dealing with many small claimants.”).
83. Id. at 527 (“The elements in 23(b) . . . provide for the protection of absentees or
non-participants.”).
84. See, e.g., Butler v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 702 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“A class action is the more efficient procedure for determining liability and damages in a
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The most obvious example of a failed attempt at reform, however, is the
adoption of an opt-out class action regime by the Supreme Court in Shutts.85
As the Court pointed out, the costs of assembling a class in 1985 through
an opt-in method were too high.86 Without an opt-out mechanism, there
would be no way to right the wrongs that normal litigation was incapable
of addressing. 87 Yet the opt-out mechanism has led to even greater
misalignment between the interests of class members and class counsel.88
Such obvious inefficiencies should have been noted and corrected long
ago, but for high transaction costs89 in forming a class and two groups who
benefit from the inefficiency of the system90—class counsel91 and defendants.92
One class action reform is slightly out of place in this discussion—the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)93—which shifted most class
actions to federal courts.94 This move was viewed as important because
of perceived abuses of the class action mechanism in state courts.95 Even
this attempt at reform has fallen short, as rent seeking has simply shifted
to the federal forum. The federalization of class actions failed, as have
many previous attempts, to adequately protect class members because
reformers failed to view class action abuses for what they are—rent seeking
by class counsel and defendants.
case such as this, involving a defect that may have imposed costs on tens of thousands of
consumers yet not a cost to any one of them large enough to justify the expense of an
individual suit.”).
85. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
87. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812–13.
88. See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
89. Transaction costs are the costs associated with creating and maintaining a
mutually beneficial transaction. See Jeremy Kidd, Kindergarten Coase, 17 GREEN BAG
2D 141, 144–45 (2014).
90. This phenomenon is not uncommon, either in the adoption of an inefficient
system or its maintenance in the face of failure, in order to protect entrenched interests.
See, e.g., Jeremy Kidd, Who’s Afraid of Uber?, 20 NEV. L.J. 581 (2020) (describing the
adoption and maintenance of the taxi medallion system). For a more technical discussion,
see Gordon Tullock, The Transitional Gains Trap, 6 BELL J. ECON. 671 (1975) and Bruce
Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect, REGUL., 1999, at 5.
91. See supra notes 58–68 and accompanying text.
92. See id.
93. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.
94. Klonoff, supra note 39, at 745.
95. Tanoh v. Dow Chemical Co., 561 F.3d 945, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (“CAFA was
designed primarily to curb perceived abuses of the class action device which, in the view
of CAFA’s proponents, had often been used to litigate multi-state or even national class
actions in state courts.”).
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The very nature of class actions sets the stage for self-dealing and
collusion, impoverishing the clients at the hands of their agents—their lawyers.
With class members almost uniformly ignorant about their agency relationship,
they can hardly be expected to effectively monitor their lawyers, leaving
the aggregate value of the victims’ claims to be divided among the
concentrated interests of defendants and class counsel. Only the courts
have the power to curb this rent seeking, but their efforts have been
sporadic and largely ineffective due to the ability of plaintiffs to forum
shop.96 It is obvious that class counsel have felt emboldened in recent
years, introducing new and improved ways to exploit their clients and
enrich themselves—the cy pres award and cy pres-only settlement, as
discussed in the following section.
III. ENTER CY PRES, STAGE LEFT
“Cy pres is a fine concept, in its proper place.” 97 Cy pres awards are
a poor fit for class action lawsuits, yet they have become a common tool
in furthering the collective goals of class action advocates.98 By depriving
class members of the value of their claims, they are a deprivation of property
without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.99 Yet they retain many defenders,
who view them as essential for achieving a just society. This section will
outline how the cy pres doctrine found its way into class action lawsuits
and how it further promotes judicial rent seeking.
A. Historical Cy Pres
The doctrine of cy pres—short for the French phrase “cy pres comme
possible,” meaning “as close as possible”100—entered our jurisprudence
in trusts and estates.101 When the grantor’s original intent becomes impossible
or illegal, the court reserves the right, under certain circumstances, to

96. Forum shopping is the practice whereby plaintiffs, faced with different likely
outcomes based on procedural and substantive legal differences between jurisdictions, choose
to file suit in the forum most likely to maximize the payout. See Ferens v. John Deere Co.,
494 U.S. 516, 527 (1990).
97. Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1312 (9th
Cir. 1990) (Fernandez, J., concurring).
98. See infra note 173.
99. See infra Section III.C.4.
100. Cy pres, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Alberto B. Lopez, A
Revaluation of Cy Pres Redux, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1307, 1308 (2010).
101. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (AM. L. INST. 2003). The earliest origins
of the doctrine appear to be in ancient Rome, entering English law by the Fourteenth Century.
Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 2, at 625.
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modify the terms, so the trust or estate could continue to operate.102 Modification
is not required and may not always be permitted. For example, in Evans
v. Abney,103 the Georgia Supreme Court refused to force the city of Macon
to give effect to the grantor’s intent—establishing a “whites only” public
park—because doing so would be unconstitutional.104 The Georgia Court
also held that the cy pres doctrine was unavailable because the proposed
modification—establishing an integrated park—was too far removed from
the grantor’s specific instructions to establish a segregated park.105 The
United States Supreme Court affirmed.106
The possibility of cy pres in any context opens the door to additional
rent seeking by those who would compete for the value of the estate or
judgment.107 If a trust or estate cannot be honored, the remaining assets
represent an unexpected windfall that someone will receive. Without cy
pres, the remaining assets will revert to the grantor or the grantor’s heirs.108
If the court applies the doctrine,109 it claims for itself quasi-equitable power
to modify the trust or estate and select a new class of beneficiaries.110 The
new beneficiaries must, in the court’s analysis, serve the charitable
purpose originally intended by the grantor—or to prevent the charity from
failing111—but the court has broad discretion in determining what new
class will best effectuate the desires of the grantor.112 In the language of
public choice economics, the grantor has established a valuable pool of
resources, and all those who might be chosen as the new class of
beneficiaries will be incentivized to compete against the grantor’s heirs—

102. Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 2, at 625; Dunbar v. Bd. of Trs., 461 P.2d
28, 30 (Colo. 1969) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (AM. L. INST.
1959)); see In re Airline Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d 679, 682 (8th Cir. 2002).
103. Evans v. Abney, 165 S.E.2d 160 (1968).
104. Id. at 164–65.
105. Id. at 164.
106. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 442, 447–48 (1970).
107. See generally Kidd, supra note 90, at 610–19 (describing the parties who engage in
rent seeking to capture or sustain the pool of monopoly rents associated with barriers to
entry in the taxi industry).
108. See Evans, 396 U.S. at 439.
109. Typically, this requires a specific finding that the grantor had a charitable intent.
See, e.g., Dunbar v. Bd. of Trs., 461 P.2d 28, 30 (Colo. 1969).
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. E.g., In re Elizabeth J.K.L. Lucas Charitable Gift, 261 P.3d 800, 806 (Haw. Ct.
App. 2011) (“Once cy pres is determined to be applicable, the lower court has discretion
in determining the appropriate modification of the charitable gift.”).
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to whom the funds will revert113 if the court declines to invoke cy pres—
to gain the court’s approval and access to the pool of resources.114
As is so often the case, the power to bestow special favors has corrupted
a doctrine originally intended to effectuate the desires of the grantor. The
doctrine was intended to preserve the grantor’s intent—to protect the
grantor’s property interests.115 However, by assuming for itself sufficient
discretion to determine how to distribute trust property, the court has
invited116 rent-seeking pressures that might distort the court’s decisions.117
The court need not have corrupt motives to reach a corrupt end; by inviting
potential beneficiaries to compete for the court’s approval, the court has
almost guaranteed that factors not directly relevant to effectuating the
grantor’s intent will be considered.118 Over time, the probability that the
court’s decision will be based on inappropriate factors will rise.
B. Cy Pres Invades Class Actions
Over the past fifty years, courts have slowly adopted the cy pres
doctrine as a tool in class action lawsuits.119 At first, the movement was
benign enough, with courts attempting to deal with a stark reality of American
class actions—they are notoriously bad at compensating the purported
victims, in whose name the case was brought.120 Although a class may
ostensibly represent millions of individuals, the percentage of those who
will receive any direct benefit from an award or settlement is low, 121
113. They may have felt slighted that the grantor gave away their inheritance and
will be glad to see it returned.
114. See supra note 107.
115. Cf. Alex M. Johnson, Jr. & Ross D. Taylor, Revolutionizing Judicial Interpretation
of Charitable Trusts: Applying Relational Contracts and Dynamic Interpretation to Cy
Pres and America’s Cup Litigation, 74 IOWA L. REV. 545, 567 (1989) (“Courts are hesitant
to employ cy pres for fear of sacrificing individual property rights by exalting the use of
property for the ‘community’ over its use and control by the donor.”).
116. It must be clearly stated, whenever possible, that power to bestow rents draws
rent seekers. Rent seeking increases to the extent that those in positions of power assume
for themselves the ability to bestow favors.
117. Johnson & Taylor, supra note 115, at 567–68.
118. See Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN.
L. REV. 191, 244 (2012) (“The problem is not the abuse of power, but rather the power to
abuse.” (quoting Rand Paul, The Public Trough, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Aug. 1, 2009, 12:00
AM), https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-public-trough/ [https://perma.cc/
3EGY-DAMA])).
119. The exact origin of cy pres in class actions was likely a 1972 student comment
in the University of Chicago Law Review. Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 2, at 631.
120. See Classaction.gov, supra note 25, at 489 & n.8.
121. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMERS AND CLASS ACTIONS: A RETROSPECTIVE
AND ANALYSIS OF SETTLEMENT CAMPAIGNS 11 (2019) (calculating the median percentage
of class members who received compensation at 9%, with a weighted average of 4%).
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typically because few class members qualify for relief. Many do not know
they are members of the class; they never apply for relief.122 Others may
know that they are members of a class but refuse to apply for relief
because they do not feel aggrieved.123 Others will seek relief but find the
application process too difficult to navigate 124 or apply and have their
claims rejected. Only a small fraction of those whose existence and alleged
injuries justified the award or settlement will ever receive payment. 125
Most class actions will have funds that remain undisbursed, and the court
must determine what to do with those funds.126
Through one lens, a class action that has reached this point looks similar
to the circumstances that gave rise to the cy pres doctrine—money set
aside for a purpose, compensating victims, that can no longer be achieved
because no further victims can be ascertained. The court must decide whether
to have the money revert to the grantor—defendant—or modify the grant
to come close to the original intent of the grant—compensating victims.
Viewed through that lens, cy pres would seem like a natural fit, so courts
utilized cy pres awards to further the goals of class action litigation,
awarding the excess funds to charitable entities whose goals might benefit
the class, so it approximates direct payment to individual plaintiffs.127
Upon further inspection, however, the analogy between trust cy pres
and class action cy pres breaks down. First, there is no grantor in a class
action—the defendant is not motivated by a charitable intent. Moreover,
the defendant is not giving anything to the class; the class is entitled to
damages by function of law and the defendant’s wrongdoing.128 Second,
class members are not merely recipients of the defendant’s benevolence;

122. See Classaction.gov, supra note 25, at 497–98.
123. Letter from John H. Beisner to the Fed. Trade Comm’n 2 (Nov. 22, 2019),
https://perma.cc/A893-HN8W.
124. See Classaction.gov, supra note 25, at 499.
125. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 121. Class counsel, of course, will always
get paid, whether or not any class members receive remuneration.
126. Kevin M. Forde, What Can a Court Do with Leftover Class Action Funds?,
LAWREADER (Dec. 31, 2016), https://lawreader.com/?p=16193 [https://perma.cc/9VLABR52].
127. Rhonda Wasserman, Cy Pres in Class Action Settlements, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 97,
116 (2014).
128. See generally ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE (2012) (describing the
moral obligation to compensate that arises when the wrongdoing upsets the balance that
existed prior to the wrongdoing).
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to the contrary, they have been harmed by the defendant’s actions and own
their claim and the value derived from it.129
Third, the nature of the choice before the court is different. In a trust,
the grantor gave valuable property to the trust but retains a superior claim
to the world, at large, should the gift no longer be able to serve the desired
purpose.130 A court, in that context, must decide whether the funds can
serve the grantor’s purpose through diverting the funds to a close substitute,
or whether the opportunity is lost and the grantor, or the grantor’s heirs,
should receive the funds in reversion.131 In a class action, the defendant’s
purpose in surrendering the funds was to obtain release of legal claims.
That purpose is achieved upon approval of the settlement, whether or not
funds remain once all ascertainable victims have been compensated.132 A
reversion to the defendant would be appropriate only if the failure of the
claims process to distribute all settlement funds represents failure to
identify prior harms to be corrected. Some have argued that reversion to the
defendant is inappropriate because that will yield insufficient deterrence,133
but without an identifiable victim, denying reversion would impose excessive
deterrence.134
Traditional cy pres doctrine in a class action setting is bad enough, but
courts have gone further, approving settlements where only third-party
charities receive value and victims receive nothing.135 These “cy presonly” settlements are a misnomer and erode the very concept of cy pres
since the primary goal of compensating victims directly is not even
attempted. These cy pres-only settlements may be more egregious, but
even earlier forms of residual cy pres awards are also problematic from a
perspective of justice. In both cases, the defendant can eliminate legal
liability without actually compensating the victim who owns the claim.
129. See generally id.
130. Even the application of cy pres is intended—when done properly—to effectuate
the intent of the grantor in disposing of her property. See In re Wanamaker’s Estate, 72 A.2d
106, 108 (Pa. 1950).
131. See Evans v. Abney, 165 S.E.2d 160, 164 (Ga. 1968).
132. See Jahan Sagafi & Tara Mohseni, Class-Action Settlements in an Ever-MoreCrowded Field, PLAINTIFF MAG. (Feb. 2017), https://www.plaintiffmagazine.com/recentissues/item/class-action-settlements-in-an-ever-more-crowded-field [https://perma.cc/
VY93-Q8NP].
133. Christine P. Bartholomew, Saving Charitable Settlements, 83 FORDHAM L. REV.
3241, 3249 (2015).
134. It is still possible that there will be insufficient deterrence, but that requires an
additional admission, that class action settlements regularly deprive victims of meaningful
compensation. See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g, Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2012) (approving
a settlement in which Facebook paid a total of $9.5 million, where $3 million was used to
pay attorney’s fees and costs, and the remaining $6.5 million was used to establish a new
charity organization).
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Cy pres in the class action context is nothing short of theft, depriving each
class member of property—their legal claims—without due process of
law.136 Even more troubling, this theft occurs at the hands of the individuals’
own counsel and the courts. The defendant’s victims are victimized yet
again, this time with the consent of those entrusted by the law to protect
the victims.
The acceptance of cy pres in class actions is so widespread that it has
found its way into state statutes. Illinois, for example, has a statute mandating
that residual settlement funds be given to “eligible organizations.”137
Illinois is not alone. As of 2018, the American Bar Association (ABA)
lists twenty-four states with statutes addressing usage of cy pres, including
California, South Dakota, Washington, Massachusetts, Tennessee,
Pennsylvania, and North Carolina. 138 Most of these states allow for
residual funds to be directed to organizations and often to indigent defense
funds, regardless of the underlying harm.139
C. Is Class Action Cy Pres Legally Justified?
Class action cy pres awards are problematic for several reasons. The
next subsection will address how cy pres settlements further exacerbate
the dangers of rent seeking, but first, this subsection will address the four
primary legal concerns arising out of cy pres awards. First, cy pres
settlements enrich many people—class counsel, defendants, and numerous
third parties—but provide little to no compensation for those who are the
owners of the claims.140 Second, transferring value belonging to the victims
occurs without consent of the victims, effectively forcing the victims to
speak in the voice of whichever charity is chosen by class counsel and
defendant.141 Third, adoption of the cy pres doctrine into class actions has
not occurred through statute but rather the impermissible creation of federal

136.
137.
138.

Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 2, at 645–46, 650.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-807 (2008).
See AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGISLATION AND COURT RULES PROVIDING FOR LEGAL
AID TO RECEIVE CLASS ACTION RESIDUALS (2018); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 384
(2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-2-57 (2021); WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 23(f)(2); MASS.
R. CIV. P. 23(e); TENN. R. CIV. P. 23.08; 231 P A. CODE § 1716 (2021); N.C. GEN. S TAT.
§ 1-267.10 (2021).
139. See supra note 138.
140. See supra Section II.2.
141. See supra Section III.C.1.
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common law.142 Fourth, one characteristic of a cy pres-only settlement is
minute damages; these damages may be so low they are not statistically
different from zero, raising doubts as to whether class members meet the
injury requirements for standing. 143 Concerns over these and other
characteristics of class action cy pres awards has led to a Circuit split
regarding their use, with the Ninth Circuit providing a favorable environment
for cy pres awards, which has led to increased forum shopping.144
1. Class Action Cy Pres is Forced Speech
The United States Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment
prevents the government from forcing individuals to express or subsidize
someone else’s point of view.145 Yet that is precisely what a cy pres award
does to any class member who has not given express consent to the award.
Our current opt-out system, besides encouraging rent seeking by class
counsel and defendants, creates a scenario where class members’ First
Amendment rights are in jeopardy. That a class member did not affirmatively
opt-out of a class is, at best, acquiescence, and “[c]ourts do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.”146 Some courts have tried
to distinguish between court-mandated cy pres awards and those which
are agreed upon by parties.147 However, given the lack of notice, they are
remarkably similar; unaware class members cannot advocate for their
rights and deserve protection.
2. Class Action Cy Pres Arises from Federal Common Law
It is questionable if cy pres even complies with Supreme Court
decisions, given that it is part of federal common law. Since Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins,148 federal common law is only allowed if it falls within
a narrow exception—it must be in an area which either “protect[s] uniquely
federal interests”149 or where Congress has allowed the courts to create

142. See supra Section III.C.2; Bartholomew, supra note 133, at 3252.
143. See supra Section III.C.3.
144. See supra Section III.C.4; Michael J. Slobom, Recalibrating Cy Pres Settlements to
Restore the Equilibrium, 123 DICK. L. REV. 281, 301 (2018).
145. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 411 (2001).
146. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 312 (2012)
(quoting Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
682 (1999)).
147. See In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 582 F.3d 156, 170 (1st
Cir. 2009).
148. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
149. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (quoting
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 426 (1964)).

600

58-3_KIDD&WHITEHEAD_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 58: 579, 2021]

10/11/2021 9:13 AM

Saving Class Members from Counsel
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

such law.150 Questionable class action settlements are often defended as
a contractual arrangement between parties to litigation,151 so perhaps the
use of cy pres in a settlement agreement does not implicate the prohibition
on federal common law. However, a class action settlement might more
correctly be understood as an agreement between class counsel and defendants,
not the actual class members.152 Viewed in that light, approving a cy pres
settlement or, worse, a cy pres-only settlement, is a court creating a rule
for the disposition of absent class members’ claims. If that rule is substantive,
then it may violate the Supreme Court’s Erie doctrine.153
3. Cy Pres May Signal a Lack of Standing
Article III of the United States Constitution grants jurisdiction to the
courts over “cases and controversies.”154 To constitutionally exercise its
authority, a court must have subject matter jurisdiction.155 The Court has
enumerated three elements that the plaintiff must show for a finding of
subject matter jurisdiction: the plaintiff must have “(1) suffered an injury
in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant,
and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”156
In cy pres settlements, the second factor is conceded,157 but there are
important questions as to whether the first and third elements are met.
The first element might not be met if the harm inflicted arises from a
mere procedural violation of statute.158 This is far more likely to be the
case in a cy pres-only settlement, which is typically justified on the
grounds that the payment to each class member would be dwarfed by the

150. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 501.
151. See, e.g., Lane, 696 F.3d at 820–21 (“We do not require as part of that doctrine
that settling parties select a cy pres recipient that the court or class members would find
ideal. On the contrary, such an intrusion into the private parties’ negotiations would be
improper and disruptive to the settlement process.”).
152. See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
153. See Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 2, at 648.
154. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).
155. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547.
156. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
157. A defendant that wants legal claims to be extinguished must be willing to concede
that payments to the class are connected to the claims being extinguished. See infra Section
III.D.2.
158. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550.
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cost of providing that compensation.159 As technology advances, making
it easier to find and compensate victims, the persistent insufficiency of
victim compensation indicates one of two uncomfortable possibilities.
Either class counsel and defendants have colluded to sell class claims for
pennies on the dollar160 or the claims themselves are de minimis and thus
far more likely to be abstract, failing to meet the Court’s requirement that
injuries be concrete before they give rise to standing.161
Even the more traditional application of cy pres to class action suits—
disposing of leftover funds to a related charitable cause—arises from the
determination that no further victims can be reasonably identified.162 If
true, this raises significant doubt about whether the unidentified members
of the class suffered an injury. To prove an injury in fact, the plaintiff must
show that the harm was particularized, meaning that it affected the plaintiff
in a “personal and individual way.”163 The harm need not be tangible—
an infringement on a plaintiff’s rights will suffice164—but not every intangible
harm will be justiciable.165 The existence of a large residual after all
victims have been identified is evidence that a significant portion of the
approved class may not have met standing requirements.
Application of the cy pres doctrine also raises questions regarding the
third element of standing—that plaintiffs must have experienced harm
that is redressable by a favorable decision.166 The Supreme Court has
complained about standing when “[w]hether . . . claims of economic injury
would be redressed by a favorable decision . . . depends on the unfettered
choices made by independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise
of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to
control or to predict.”167 If a court approves cy pres to substitute charities
for plaintiffs, it is approving a remedy that does not redress the actual
harm suffered by class members. The charity is enlisted to mitigate
the harm suffered by the plaintiff, but the plaintiff is not made whole, and
the wrong has not been redressed. Any future redress of wrongs is purely
speculative.
159. See Bartholomew, supra note 133, at 3245; see also Goutam U. Jois, The Cy
Pres Problem and the Role of Damages in Tort Law, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 258, 264
(2008) (“[T]he costs of identifying and notifying the class members may be higher than
the amount of their potential recovery, such that notifying the members would deplete the
entire fund.”).
160. See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
161. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548.
162. Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 473–74 (5th Cir. 2011).
163. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1).
164. Id. at 1549.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1547.
167. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615 (1989).
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Not all cases involving cy pres lack standing, but courts should scrutinize
all cases before them, including class actions. That courts have failed to
do so may be because few have considered the arguments in this subsection.
Courts may have abdicated this responsibility because they view class
action settlements—few class actions actually make it past the settlement
stage168—as contracts between private parties, such that courts should not
intervene.169 Because the settlement disposes of absent class members’
claims, however, the court’s responsibility to verify standing remains.
4. Going (Forum) Shopping for Cy Pres
There is a distinct divide between the circuits on approval of cy pres in
class action lawsuits. The Second, Third, and Fifth Circuit courts have
held that cy pres is allowed as part of a class action settlement only if used
to dispose of excess funds, preserving compensation as the primary
purpose of any settlement.170 The Seventh Circuit has rejected cy pres in
class actions, suggesting that it leads to self-dealing by counsel and
defendants.171 The Ninth Circuit has largely endorsed all forms of class
action cy pres.172
This choice by the Ninth Circuit has led to a disparity in where cy pres
appears in class action settlements. Although there has been a broader
trend of increased use of cy pres, a disproportionate share appears to be
filed in California federal courts.173 California district courts are certainly
168. In 2019, 60.3% of class actions settled, down from 73.1% in 2018. CARLTON
FIELDS, 2020 CARLTON FIELDS CLASS ACTION SURVEY 35 (2020).
169. E.g., Lane, 696 F.3d at 821 (opining that inquiring too carefully into the
settlement would be “an intrusion into the parties’ negotiations [that] would be improper
and disruptive to the settlement process”).
170. In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2013); Klier v. Elf
Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2011); Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency,
Inc., 473 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2007).
171. Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 784–85 (7th Cir. 2004).
172. The extreme example is Lane v. Facebook, Inc. See infra notes 229–30 and
accompanying text.
173. As of June 17, 2020, a Westlaw search for the terms “class action” and “cy pres”
yielded 919 results in federal courts. WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/
Home.html (choose filters option next to search bar; then select box next to “All Federal”;
then click the “Save” button; then search “‘class action’ and ‘cy pres’” in the search bar).
Of those, twenty-three were from the Ninth Circuit and 395 from district courts within the
Ninth Circuit. Id. Adding in two Supreme Court mentions arising from appeals of Ninth
Circuit decisions, the 420 documents from Ninth Circuit cases comprise 45.7% of all
relevant documents. Id. A strong plurality, 364 or 37.3%, and 162—17.6% of the total

603

58-3_KIDD&WHITEHEAD_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/11/2021 9:13 AM

busy but not busy enough to explain such a large disparity in cy pres class
action filings.
The Ninth Circuit has put out the welcome mat for class actions, generally,
and cy pres settlements, specifically, by creating a highly favorable
environment for settlements. Settlements can be a fertile field for selfinterested collusion between class counsel and defendants, so the Ninth
Circuit has stated that district courts should extensively review all settlements174
and should not approve a settlement that is the product of overreaching,
collusion, or fraud of the negotiating parties. 175 Unfortunately, these
seemingly strict standards are often ignored by district courts, and the
Ninth Circuit has refused to enforce the standards.176 Lax enforcement of
any rule guarantees greater rule breaking, and so it has been in the Ninth
Circuit.
Even outside the cy pres context, the Ninth Circuit’s standards for reviewing
a settlement proposal are problematic. District courts are to consider the
following factors:
(1) the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely
duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action status
throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of
discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience and
views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental participant; and (8) the
reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. 177

At first blush, this list may seem appropriate, but closer examination
of some factors and the Ninth Circuit’s application of the standards raises
serious questions.
Settlements should be encouraged when there is a genuine question of
liability and where both parties are better served by saving the cost of
litigation.178 If claims are meritless or unlikely to withstand litigation, they
should be discouraged, as they amount to using the judiciary for extortion.
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit’s application of these standards gets this
almost exactly backwards. When considering the first factor—strength of
and 44.5% of all California federal cases—are from the Northern District of California.
Id.
174. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998).
175. Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1290 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing
Ficalora v. Lockheed Cal. Co., 751 F.2d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 1985)).
176. See, e.g., Lane, 696 F.3d at 821 (approving a district court settlement approval
that failed to even mention the requirement that it conduct a “rigorous analysis,” as
required by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.
Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011))).
177. Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004).
178. Cf. Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential
Settlements, 105 M ICH. L. REV. 867, 871–72 (2007) (describing the costs avoided by
settlement).
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the plaintiff’s case—for example, the Ninth Circuit has stated that a weaker
plaintiff’s case argues for the district court’s approval of the settlement.179
This will incentivize far more marginal cases that class counsel and
defendants can settle for pennies on the dollar, thus enriching themselves.
Similarly, when considering the third factor—risk of maintaining the
class action status through trial—district courts in the Ninth Circuit have
held that a real possibility of decertification during trial argues for
settlement approval. 180 Approving a settlement for a class likely to be
certified—or perhaps never to be certified in the first place—provides yet
another incentive for filing marginal class action cases in the Ninth
Circuit. If class status is precarious, then class members’ claims are well
suited to individual resolution, and it is even less defensible to gather class
members and bind them to a settlement without meaningful consent.
Considering the class action system’s strong incentive towards selfenrichment at the expense of absent class members, the Ninth Circuit’s
sixth factor—experience and views of counsel—is laughable. Because
counsel can collect high attorney’s fees while providing little of meaningful
value to the class, there is no incentive for class counsel to object to their
own settlement. Granting greater deference to more experienced counsel
provides an unnecessary barrier to competition in the class action space.181
Given how problematic this factor is, it is perhaps a positive sign that the
Ninth Circuit will occasionally affirm a district court that approves a settlement
without even discussing the experience or views of counsel.182 That the
Ninth Circuit retains this factor indicates a desire to have it available when
it will make the difference, such as in a marginal case where the proposed
settlement is problematic.
The ability of class members to object to the settlement should provide
a check against abuse, as it provides the adversarial pushback that is supposed

179. See Churchill, 361 F.3d at 576.
180. E.g., Couser v. Comenity Bank, 125 F. Supp. 3d 1034, 1042 (S.D. Cal. 2015)
(“Based on the parties’ representations to the Court, there is a risk that the Class would
either not be certified or that something may arise before trial to decertify the class. Thus,
this factor weighs in favor of settlement.”).
181. Increased competition in this space would hurt the bottom line of class counsel,
but to the advantage of the class. See Kidd, supra note 8, at 1257.
182. See, e.g., In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“[T]he record confirms that [counsel] were [experienced] and no one asserts otherwise.”).
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to define our legal system183 but is largely absent in class action settlements.184
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit has largely abandoned its responsibility
to scrutinize the settlement, given the claims of objectors. For example,
in Churchill Village, LLC v. General Electric Co., the Ninth Circuit
largely ignored or dismissed the claims of forty-five objectors because
they represented such a small portion of the approximately 90,000 notified
plaintiffs.185 As a foundational matter, the merits of the claims should always
be the top consideration of any court, even if raised by only a single objector;
the claims are individual and a single individual can be right even in the
face of overwhelming opposition. But even as a practical matter, the court’s
rationale defies what we know about class action notification, claims, and
compensation.
The median rate at which plaintiffs claim their part of the award in a
consumer class action is 0.023%.186 For every million plaintiffs in a class,
two hundred thirty will successfully make a claim on settlement funds.
Given the number of plaintiffs in Churchill, an ex-ante analysis would
predict there would be approximately twenty-three plaintiffs that actually
received any funds from the settlement.187 Rather than being insignificant,
forty-five objectors was monumental. It is entirely possible there was
something about the Churchill class that indicated a much higher claim
rate, but the Ninth Circuit did not engage in any analysis of that sort,
which renders the final analysis suspect.
In allowing cy pres to flourish in a class action setting, the Ninth Circuit
flouts the requirements imposed on it by Rule 23.188 Although Rule 23
does not specifically address cy pres awards—notwithstanding an attempt
to amend the Rule to include reference to cy pres189—it expressly states
that a court should:

183. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 377 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“Absent competent counsel, ready and able to subject the prosecution’s case to the
‘crucible of meaningful adversarial testing,’ there can be no guarantee that the adversarial
system will function properly to produce just and reliable results.” (quoting United States
v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984)).
184. See supra Section II.2.
185. Churchill, 361 F.3d at 577.
186. Daniel Fisher, Odds of a Payoff in Consumer Class Action? Less than a Straight
Flush, FORBES (May 8, 2014, 4:49 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/05/08/
odds-of-a-payoff-in-consumer-class-action-less-than-a-straight-flush/#1f3581732782
[https://perma.cc/4YD8-AFV4].
187. See id; infra note 185 and accompanying text.
188. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
189. Andrew Rodheim, Note, Class Action Settlements, Cy Pres Awards, and the
Erie Doctrine, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1099–100 (2017).
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approve [a settlement] only after a hearing and only on finding that it is fair,
reasonable, and adequate after considering whether:
(A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the
class;
(B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length;
(C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account:
(i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal;
(ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to class,
including the method of processing class-member claims;
(iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including timing of
payment; and
(iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and
(D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.190

Given the strong incentives for collusion between class counsel and
defendants, all class actions should be closely scrutinized under subsection
(B). Unfortunately, this part of the analysis is almost always superficial,
ignoring the potential for rent seeking. Given the shallow analysis on this
point by most courts, it is likely that only defense counsel and class
counsel being part of the same firm would rouse courts from their slumber.
The Ninth Circuit and other courts have largely rendered subsection (B) a
dead letter, even before considering the increased rent seeking that arises
from application of cy pres.191
Perhaps worse is the abandonment of any substantial application of
subsection (C), which requires that the settlement award be adequate. Class
action settlements are often large, on aggregate, but small when considered
from the viewpoint of an individual claimant.192 If the courts emphasized
protection of individual class members’ rights, most class action settlements
would need to be rejected, as the pennies-on-the-dollar nature of class action
compensation193 is inadequate by almost any criteria. Instead, courts like
the Ninth Circuit look almost exclusively at the aggregate amount and
approve claims where class counsel receive large fee awards—another red
flag under subsection (C)—simply because they have a high total dollar
figure attached.194

190. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
191. See infra Section III.D.
192. See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
193. E.g., In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig., 716 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting a
settlement in which the class received coupons for printer and printer supplies purchased
from the defendant).
194. See infra Section III.D.
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Even worse is the Ninth Circuit’s approval of cy pres-only settlements,
in which the individual class members receive nothing. For example, in
Lane v. Facebook, no absent class member received any compensation or
even a coupon.195 Instead, Facebook agreed to correct its infringement of
class members’ privacy by contributing to a nonprofit that was ostensibly
dedicated to internet privacy issues. In In re Google Referrer Header Privacy
Litigation,196 Google agreed to settle hundreds of millions of claims, paying
nothing to class members.197 Instead, it agreed to pay a range of nonprofits
who work on internet privacy issues.198
These trends in the Ninth Circuit and, to a lesser extent, in other
jurisdictions, not only violate Rule 23 but also the Due Process Clause of
the United States Constitution.199 Class members, including absent class
members, are guaranteed several protections.200 First, class members are
entitled to notice and the opportunity to intervene in the suit.201 The notice
must be reasonable under the circumstances and must be likely to inform
class members of their involvement and ability to object.202 Second, although
a class may be constructed through an opt-out mechanism, class members
must be notified of their ability to opt-out from the class.203 Third, named
counsel must “at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent
class members.”204 The Ninth Circuit, for many years, failed to provide
meaningful oversight of class action settlements, so it is unsurprising that
it has effectively consented to a continued deprivation of absent class
members’ due process rights.
D. Rent Seeking at the Nexus of Class Actions and Cy Pres
Why the Ninth Circuit refuses to uphold its responsibilities regarding
class actions is unclear, but the motivation of class counsel and defendants
in continuing to propose settlements that violate absent class members’
rights is clear—they each gain private benefits. The incentives for class
counsel and defendants to engage in rent seeking205 are both common and

195. Lane, 696 F.3d at 817 (describing that all settlement funds would go to attorneys
and the cy pres recipient).
196. In re Google Referrer Header Priv. Litig., 869 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2017).
197. Id. at 741–42.
198. Id. at 741.
199. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
200. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811–12.
201. Id. at 812.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See supra note 8.
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strong in the class action context.206 Individual rent seeking would be
troubling, as it distorts the search for justice, but the incentives for rent seeking
in class actions are even worse, as they encourage collusion between
defendants and class counsel in ways that leave class members with no
protection. Even the traditional cy pres doctrine introduces incentives for
rent seeking, with outside groups jostling for a piece of the pool of
resources. Adding cy pres to class actions increases the opportunities and
incentives to engage in rent seeking beyond merely the sum of the two—
which would be bad enough—but new incentives are created, making cy
pres highly desirable for class counsel, defendants, and potentially judges.207
1. Class Counsel
Any rent-seeking analysis of class action must begin with class counsel
and the rents they seek in large fee awards drawn from the settlement
before any distribution to class members. The size of the awards has
drawn criticism in the past, 208 but that lawyer fees are the subject of a
lawyer’s maximization problem should not come as a surprise to anyone.
Given the fiduciary responsibility of the lawyer, the inherent principalagent conflict in any lawyer-client relationship, and that class counsel’s
fees come from the settlement, it is appropriate that class counsel are
restricted to recovering only “reasonable attorney’s fees.”209 Scrutinizing
fee requests for reasonableness falls to courts,210 which often means that
the fee request is judged against the value of the settlement achieved for

206. See supra Section II.2.
207. See Nachshin v. AOL, L.L.C., 663 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011) (“When
selection of cy pres beneficiaries is not tethered to the nature of the lawsuit and the interests
of the silent class members, the selection process may answer to the whims and self interests of
the parties, their counsel, or the court.”).
208. See Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 573 F.2d 733, 735 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Class actions,
termed by some as ‘lawyer’s lawsuits,’ . . . have received a good deal of criticism; and
much of this has been directed at the substantial fees awarded to class attorneys.” (citation
omitted)).
209. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h).
210. Most courts will judge reasonableness either by the lodestar method or by
percentage of the total value of the settlement. See In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab.
Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011). The lodestar method determines reasonableness
by multiplying the hours spent by some hourly rate; it is typically used when courts cannot
easily discern the value of the settlement. E.g., Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011,
1029 (9th Cir. 1998).
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the class.211 In an ideal world, lawyers would not need judicial review to
guarantee that their fee requests were properly solicitous of their clients’
interests, but careful judicial review should yield that result even in a nonideal world. Unfortunately, much judicial review of class action settlements
has been less than careful,212 creating a space in which class counsel can
be enriched without commensurate benefit to the class. That space increases
with the availability of cy pres settlements, and even more with cy presonly settlements.
Foremost, cy pres awards allow class counsel to receive benefits not
directly accounted for in the fee request. A lawyer who provides a large
check to a charitable or otherwise nonprofit organization will be lauded
for the great service done to those being served by the organization. Class
counsel, by arranging a cy pres award, can maximize the traditional fee
award and then achieve additional benefits from being philanthropic with
the remainder. This reputational benefit to class counsel might be diminished
somewhat if it were publicly understood that the funds belong not to the
lawyers but to victimized individuals who will now not receive money to
compensate them for their loss. Fortunately for class counsel, society is
largely blind to how the award is obtained. Often, the situation is even
worse, for class counsel can choose award recipients that will bestow even
more direct benefit to counsel, such as by donating to the lawyer’s own
alma mater.213
With a cy pres-only settlement, there are additional incentives to engage
in self-dealing because there may be no one left to object.214 Defendants
will not likely object to a settlement they have helped to craft and will
often agree to a “clear sailing” provision, which binds them to not object
to even the amount of attorney fees. 215 Named plaintiffs are unlikely
to object since the settlement will probably include a not-insignificant
payment to them,216 and they may exert influence on the choice of the

211. E.g., In re Domestic Air Transp. Antritrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 351 (N.D.
Ga. 1993) (“The Court finds that a reduced percentage award of fees and expenses of
5.25% is appropriate in this action given the size of the recovery.”).
212. See supra Section III.C.4.
213. E.g., Ashley Roberts, Law School Gets $5.1 Million to Fund New Center, GW
HATCHET (Dec. 3, 2007, 12:00 AM), https://www.gwhatchet.com/2007/12/03/law-schoolgets-5-1-million-to-fund-new-center/ [https://perma.cc/YU7F-W43D].
214. The presence of opposition reduces the net return to any investment, so elimination
of opposition raises the benefits of rent seeking and, everything else held constant, should
increase rent seeking.
215. In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011).
It can be reasonably anticipated that every concession granted to class counsel will be
purchased with something beneficial to defendants. See id.
216. See Lane, 696 F.3d at 829 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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cy pres recipient.217 Any interest that absent class members might have
paid to the case, based on expected compensation, will be eliminated by
assuring that no compensation is forthcoming. It is becoming definitional
that cy pres-only settlements have a low per-class-member recovery,218 so
class members can derive no significant benefit from objecting.219 Finally,
cy pres award recipients will not object, even though the lawyer’s fees
will be deducted from their award—any non-negative amount will still be
greater than what they could have expected to receive from the class.
2. Defendants
Although a settlement requires a defendant to pay damages, it has obvious
benefits—primarily, the release from legal liability. The defendant no
longer needs to be concerned about the potential cost and disruption of
litigating many claims. Class actions, in theory, represent a significant
cost—potentially bankruptcy-level cost—if the defendant loses the case.220
Given the voluntary nature of a settlement, defendants will only agree if
the cost of settling is less than the cost of litigating, so plaintiffs will offer,
and defendants will accept such a settlement.221 Class action settlements
go far beyond this and resolve claims for pennies on the dollar. Class
counsel propose or agree to this on condition that the total class size
be increased, so the total judgment is high enough to justify a large fee

217. See id.
218. See In re Google Referrer Header Priv. Litig., 869 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir. 2017)
(approving settlement because it was “non-distributable,” primarily because the per-classmember compensation was “a paltry 4 cents”). Disturbingly, the Ninth Circuit did
not consider that, by approving the class under these conditions, it was incentivizing defendants
and class counsel to intentionally structure the settlement with low per -class-member
recovery, so as to maximize the likelihood of court approval.
219. At best, a class member would be enriched by far less than the cost of filing an
objection. For a general overview of how to file an objection, along with related questions,
see Erin Shaak, Class Action FAQs: How to Object to a Class Action Settlement,
CLASSACTION.ORG (Aug. 7, 2019, 12:08 PM), https://www.classaction.org/blog/class-actionfaqs-how-to-object-to-a-class-action-settlement [https://perma.cc/YEC8-JL88].
220. For example, consider the class of 129 million in a recent class action, In re
Google Referrer Header Priv. Litig., 869 F.3d at 740. The $8.5 million settlement is not
insignificant but pales in comparison to what a jury trial might award. If the damages were
assessed at $100 per class member, Google would face a $12.9 billion liability. See id.
221. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 549 (1991).
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award.222 Increasing the size of the class is music to a defendant’s ears,
so long as the per-claim cost remains low.223
When cy pres awards become part of a settlement, the net cost of settling
is reduced by generating nonlegal benefits from the settlement. Besides
obtaining a release from legal claims, the defendant gets reputational
benefits from having been part of the discussions that resulted in charities
receiving additional funds.224 Rather than being the villain that must pay
victims in restitution for harms caused, the defendant becomes—in some
eyes—a partial hero, benefitting society through charitable giving.225 The
awards might also bestow tax benefits on the defendant226 and, sometimes,
might merely displace existing giving, so the settlement has a lower net
cost. In an extreme case, where a settlement precisely mirrors the defendant’s
planned giving, precisely offsetting a reduction in charitable giving, the net
cost of the settlement might be close to zero. The punitive and deterrence
goals of class actions fail in that scenario.227 Because a cy pres settlement
also deprives victims of compensation, compensatory goals will also suffer.228
Those harmed are not made whole, and those responsible are not required
to do anything they might not already do.
Clever defendants might donate the cy pres award to themselves, as
occurred in Lane, where the Ninth Circuit approved a settlement in which
all but attorney’s fees were to be given to a newly formed foundation that
would have, as one of three directors, the defendant’s Director of Public
Policy.229 The Digital Trust Foundation (DTF) has three board members
and a mission to promote internet safety and security.230 The court approved
defendant’s plan to make right its wrongdoing, not by paying funds to those
actually injured by the wrongdoing, but instead by: (1) creating an entity
ostensibly dedicated to not doing what the defendant had done; (2) placing
222. E.g., Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 785 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Would it
be too cynical to speculate that what may be going on here is that class counsel wanted a
settlement that would give them a generous fee and Fleet wanted a settlement that would
extinguish 1.4 million claims against it at no cost to itself?”).
223. Even potentially frivolous claims can be profitably disposed of in a class action
settlement, as long as enough of them are aggregated together. See In re Google, 869 F.3d
at 742.
224. Wasserman, supra note 127, at 120.
225. See id.
226. See In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2012).
But see Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 867–68 (9th Cir. 2012) (questioning the
value of a cy pres award to a charity the defendant already donated to, which might also
be tax deductible). See generally 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2018) (outlining the rules for charitable
deductions).
227. See Dennis, 697 F.3d at 868.
228. See Wasserman, supra note 127, at 107.
229. Lane, 696 F.3d at 817; see infra Section IV.A.
230. Lane, 696 F.3d at 817.
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one of the defendant’s managers as a director of that entity; and (3) funding
the entity with funds that belong to the victims of its wrongdoing.231
3. Judges
Perhaps the most troubling part about cy pres awards in the class action
context is the appearance of judicial corruption, should defendants and
class counsel choose award recipients with some connection to the judge.
This pressure cannot exist in the settlement of a traditional lawsuit, due to
the voluntary, contractual nature of standard settlements.232 Class action
settlements, generally, are also free from this difficulty; judges must scrutinize
any settlement to assure that it is “fair, reasonable, and adequate,”233 but
the value created by the settlement is divided amongst defendant, class,
and counsel. Once cy pres awards have been introduced into the system,
there will be an incentive for class counsel and defendants to choose
award recipients that will be appealing to the judge who will approve the
settlement. The appearance of impropriety raises questions of compliance
with rules governing federal judges.234
Judges receiving a benefit from a cy pres award they approved typically
involves funds for the judge’s alma mater.235 In one case, Fairchild v. AOL,
L.L.C.,236 the cy pres award included payment to the Legal Aid Foundation
of Los Angeles, and the trial judge’s husband sat on the board of that
charity.237 Perhaps the charity offers tremendous benefits to society, but
“the specter of judges and outside entities dealing in the distribution and
231. See id.
232. While there will always be principle-agent problems in the relationship between
lawyers and their clients, a lawyer negotiating a settlement is required to communicate the
settlement with, and obtain approval from, the client. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r.
1.2, 1.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 1983).
233. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
234. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES CANON 2 U.S. CTS. (U.S. CTS. 2019);
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT CANON 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
235. See Debra Cassens Weiss, W. Va. Law School Gets $8M in Unclaimed Settlement
Money, ABA J. (May 6, 2008, 2:54 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
w_va_law_school_gets_8m_in_unclaimed_settlement_money [https://perma.cc/W5VP-CWAY];
Andrew Clevenger, WVU Law School Gets $8 Million Windfall, WVGAZETTE.COM (May 2,
2008), https://www.law.wvu.edu/files/d/0632d25e-4394-485e-9009-9cf8e935cd20/bloomnews-pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9W8-76DF].
236. Fairchild v. AOL, L.L.C., No. CV 09-03568, 2009 WL 10680758 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 31, 2009), rev’d sub nom. Nachshin v. AOL, L.L.C., 663 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011)
(class action settlement agreement).
237. Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1037–38.
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solicitation of large sums of money creates an appearance of impropriety.”238
Rent seeking is common in class actions, particularly when cy pres awards
are utilized. The apparent attempt to corrupt the impartiality of judges is
troubling, but so is collusion between defendants and class counsel, particularly
because that collusion occurs at the direct expense of class members.
IV. FRANK V. GAOS—A RAY OF HOPE FOR VICTIMS OR
MORE OF THE SAME?
Whether cy pres awards are permissible in the class action context had
remained exclusively at the circuit court level until 2013, when Chief
Justice John Roberts opined, in a concurrence to a denial of certiorari,239
that “[i]n a suitable case, this Court may need to clarify the limits on the
use of such remedies.”240 Such a case appeared in early 2018, when the
High Court granted a writ of certiorari in Frank,241 a case from the Ninth
Circuit, in which a class action purporting to represent 129 million
individuals—40% of the population of the United States—settled for only
$8.5 million, with zero dollars going to the class. 242 This section will
summarize the Frank case and identify the issues before the Court, and
the Court’s decision to dispose of the case on standing, rather than on the
merits.243
Regardless of the Court’s decision, merely agreeing to hear the case has
elevated the question to national prominence, creating an opportunity for
a meaningful dialogue about cy pres and its application in class action
settlements. This section will argue that the Court missed an excellent
opportunity to eliminate the tensions between individuals and the aggregate
pursuit of their remedies. The Court could have addressed cy pres in several
ways: first, by recognizing that advances in technology have reduced
transaction costs and eliminated the need for an opt-out class action regime;
and second, by banning cy pres awards and encouraging alternative remedies.
Finally, this section will show that, despite the appearance that the opinion
avoids addressing cy pres, the Court may have provided support for the
argument that a case for which cy pres is viewed as necessary is one in
which there is no standing.244

238. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
239. See generally Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013).
240. Id. at 9 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
241. Frank, 139 S. Ct. at 1041.
242. Id. at 1045.
243. See id. at 1046.
244. See supra Section III.C.3.
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A. Chief Justice Roberts in Lane
In 2012, Facebook reached a class action settlement with 3,663,651
plaintiffs245 regarding claims it had released user information without
permission.246 The settlement included payment by Facebook of $9.5
million, of which $2,364,973 went to class counsel.247 Six and a half million
dollars was designated to establish the charity organization DTF.248 The
charity’s articles of incorporation indicate that the charity is to be run by
three directors, one of which was to be Timothy Sparapani, Facebook’s
Director for Public Policy.249 The remainder was reserved for paying costs
and incentives to class representatives.250
Although the court denied certiorari, Chief Justice Roberts included a
statement in the denial. Chief Justice Roberts agreed with the denial of
certiorari, but only because the appeal was based on specific parts of the
cy pres award; particularly the beneficiary, DTF.251 Instead, he stated that
the court should take a case which would allow it to address more
“fundamental concerns” with using cy pres.252 Chief Justice Roberts’s
concern is also reflected in his recitation of the case, which is unfavorable
to the settlement reached.253
Justice Roberts’s concerns echo those of Ninth Circuit Judge Kleinfeld’s,
who dissented in Lane. He lambasted the court for approving the settlement,
stating not only that the settlement violated the Circuit requirements for
cy pres but also that counsel failed to give adequate notice to the class,
who stood to lose its award, which is a property right.254 Judge Klienfeld
did not parse words:
The majority approves ratification of a class action settlement in which class
members get no compensation at all. They do not get one cent. They do not get
even an injunction against Facebook doing exactly the same thing to them again.
Their purported lawyers get millions of dollars. Facebook gets a bar against any
claims any of them might make for breach of their privacy rights. The most we
could say for the cy pres award is that in exchange for giving up any claims they
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Lane, 696 F.3d at 818.
Id. at 816.
Id. at 818.
Id. at 817.
Id.
Id.
Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Id.
See id. at 8–9.
Lane, 696 F.3d at 826–35 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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may have, the exposed Facebook users get the satisfaction of contributing to a
charity to be funded by Facebook, partially controlled by Facebook, and advised
by a legal team consisting of Facebook’s counsel and their own purported counsel
whom they did not hire and have never met. 255

Besides Chief Justice Roberts and Judge Klienfeld, Judge Smith of the
Ninth Circuit wrote a dissent in the denial to review Lane v. Facebook en
banc, expressing concern with the nexus between the harm experienced
and the cy pres award.256 Specifically, he objects to the mission of the cy
pres recipient, which he believes is not aligned with addressing the
plaintiffs’ claims.257
B. Frank v. Gaos
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Frank,258 it appeared that
the Court might finally address the appropriateness of cy pres as a tool for
class action settlements. The class action was filed against Google for
allegedly allowing third parties to access sensitive information regarding
users’ internet searches.259 Frank argued that it was not fair, reasonable,
and adequate for the courts to approve giving the class action settlement
to “third parties unconnected to the litigation.”260
Unfortunately, when the Supreme Court issued its holding on March
20, 2019, it failed to address the legitimacy of cy pres.261 Instead, the
Court focused on an issue that the lower courts did not address—standing.262
It raised the standing issue sua sponte,263 relying on DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno.264 The Court’s core concern about standing stems from
the holding in Spokeo v. Robins265 that violating a statutory right does not
automatically satisfy the standing requirement for injury-in-fact.266 In
light of the lower court’s failure to find standing under a violation of the
Stored Communications Act (SCA), Frank was remanded for further
findings.267 Justice Thomas dissented, arguing there was standing and that

255. Id. at 835.
256. Lane, 709 F.3d at 793–95 (Smith, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 794.
258. Frank, 139 S. Ct. at 1041.
259. In re Google Referrer Header Priv. Litig., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1122, 1126–27 (N.D.
Cal. 2015).
260. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 4, Frank, 139 S. Ct. at 1041 (No. 17-961).
261. See generally Frank, 139 S. Ct. at 1041.
262. Id. at 1045–46.
263. See id. at 1046.
264. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
265. Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1540.
266. Frank, 139 S. Ct. at 1046.
267. Id.
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the settlement’s failure to compensate all members of the class while
enriching named plaintiffs and their counsel was fatal.268
C. Cambridge Analytica
The continued failure of the Supreme Court to address the appropriateness
of cy pres in class action settlements will embolden its use. Given
the boundary-pushing nature of technology companies, there will be no
shortage of mass privacy violations to motivate its use, even if the harm
is de minimis. In 2018, for example, Cambridge Analytica was accused
of improperly using information from users’ Facebook profiles.269 The
data was allegedly bought from a researcher claiming to use the information
for educational purposes.270 With likely 50 million people affected, this
case bears a striking resemblance to Lane.271
Numerous lawsuits were filed against Facebook based on those allegations,
and those claims were consolidated into the Northern District of California,
where one claim had been filed. 272 Following the Supreme Court’s
remand of Frank, Facebook moved to dismiss, claiming that the plaintiffs
lacked standing.273 Despite expressing concerns that the complaint was
filled with vague claims,274 Judge Vince Chhabria refused to dismiss most

268. Id. at 1047 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
269. Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Confessore & Carole Cadwalladr, How Trump
Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html
[https://perma.cc/49G7-9WC4].
270. Id.
271. Id.; see supra Section IV.A.
272. In re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Priv. User Profile Litig., 402 F. Supp. 3d 767,
778 (N.D. Cal. 2019). A related securities class action was filed against Cambridge
Analytica in the Northern District of California but was dismissed on September 25, 2019.
In re Facebook, Inc. Sec. Litig. 405 F. Supp. 3d 809, 849 (N.D. Cal. 2019). A shareholder
derivative lawsuit was also filed in the Northern District; on March 22, 2019, the plaintiffs’
state law claims were dismissed with leave to refile in the Delaware Court of Chancery,
and federal law claims were dismissed for failure to plead demand with particularity, with
leave to amend. In re Facebook, Inc. S’holder Derivative Priv. Litig., 367 F. Supp. 3d
1108, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2019). Plaintiffs’ amended complaint was filed in December 2019.
First Amended Complaint, In re Facebook, Inc. S’holder Derivative Priv. Litig., 367 F.
Supp. 3d 1108 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 4:18-CV-01792-HSG).
273. In re Facebook, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 3d at 776.
274. Id. at 779 (“Overall, the presence of so many disparate and vague allegations
makes it nearly impossible for Facebook to meaningfully respond to all of them, much less
for the Court to effectively address them.”). Interestingly, the complaint apparently included a
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claims,275 holding that: (1) plaintiffs’ right of privacy claims were sufficiently
particularized to qualify as injuries-in-fact;276 and (2) the complaint sufficiently
alleged that the plaintiffs did not contractually consent to sharing
information.277
Interestingly, Judge Chhabria did not mention the Supreme Court’s
holding in Frank in his discussion of standing. The two cases differ, since
the claims in Frank were statutory,278 while the claims before Judge
Chhabria were common law claims.279 Nevertheless, given the overlap
between the claims—privacy claims arising from application of emerging
technology to the internet business model—it would have been unremarkable
for the court to allow the Supreme Court’s decision to at least inform the
discussion on standing. The decision in Frank could have led lower courts
to observe that some class actions should be dismissed for lack of standing,
but, at least in the Northern District of California, that lesson has been
ignored.
It is also worth noting that between the time the claims were filed and
the time Judge Chhabria issued his decision, the claims had begun to expand,
covering a much larger range of alleged privacy violations.280 This is
expected as class counsel and defendants collude, indicating a settlement
is likely in the making. 281 While it is too early to know whether the
settlement will involve cy pres, perhaps even as a cy pres-only settlement,
there is a clear reluctance by at least one lower court to view Chief Justice
Roberts’s prior comments as guidance on the appropriateness of the doctrine.
V. HOW TO MOVE FORWARD
It remains to be seen when, if ever, the High Court will offer concrete
guidance on how, when, or whether cy pres settlements might be appropriate
in class action litigation. If the Court upholds their use, those who favor

made-up term, “psychographic marketing,” and the plaintiffs provided no explanation of
what the term means. Id.
275. Plaintiffs’ claims sounding in the right of publicity were dismissed because the
court “[could] not conceive of a way that the plaintiffs could successfully allege this
claim.” Id. at 803. The claims sounding in California’s Unfair Competition Law were
dismissed because the plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged a loss of money or property
as a result of Facebook’s actions. Id. at 803–04.
276. Id. at 783–84. Plaintiffs had also claimed that Facebook’s actions increased the
risk of identity theft and loss of economic value, but the court dismissed these claims for
lack of standing. Id. at 784.
277. Id. at 787.
278. See Frank, 139 S. Ct. at 1041.
279. See supra note 275.
280. See In re Facebook, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 3d at 779.
281. See supra Section III.D.2.
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their use will be pleased,282 and critics will need to find legislative solutions
to reform their use. If the Court rejects the use of cy pres awards, courts
and legislatures will still face the question of what to do about class actions
characterized by low-value, high-volume claims. The problems associated
with these class actions will not go away simply because the Court has
declared that some people’s preferred solution is off limits.
This section addresses opportunities to reform or replace cy pres as a
tool in class actions. First to be considered will be proposals for reforming
cy pres awards to allow them to be used acceptably.283 Proposals for
replacing cy pres with other tools will then be considered. Throughout,
this section will operate from three foundational beliefs. First, that “there
are many ways to resolve a mass dispute through collective litigation and
negotiation, and some are better than others.”284 Second, and relatedly,
that the primary problem with cy pres awards is that they generate rentseeking collusion, self-dealing,285 and the potential apparent corruption of
judicial impartiality.286 All reform efforts, therefore, will be judged according
to how well they can minimize those costs. Third, that class actions
actually represent a range of judicial scenarios, so there may not be a
single solution; courts should therefore see themselves as having a variety
of solutions to the class action problem and should tailor their solution to
the particular circumstances.
A. Reform Proposals
1. Pro Rata Distribution of Remainder to Plaintiffs
who Claim an Award
One straightforward suggestion is that the unclaimed portion of a
settlement should go to those who do claim their award.287 If funds remain
after all identified victims have been compensated, the court should order

282. See, e.g., Bartholomew, supra note 133 (justifying why charitable settlements
must be preserved).
283. See Wilber H. Boies & Latonia Haney Keith, Class Action Settlement Residue
and Cy Pres Awards: Emerging Problems and Practical Solutions, 21 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y
& L. 267, 283–84 (2014).
284. Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class
Action Settlements, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 864 (2016).
285. See supra Section III.D.
286. See supra Section III.D.3.
287. Wasserman, supra note 127, at 111; Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 2, at 639.
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the remaining funds be distributed, pro rata, to those identified victims.
This solution offers marginal improvements from a cy pres residual award,
in that class counsel and defendants do not get the philanthropic-reputation
benefit of bestowing gifts upon charitable organizations. Settlement funds
would go to identified and verified victims, better fulfilling the purpose
of our judicial system,288 and class counsel would still get reputational
benefits from making the defendant pay for harm caused. Neither class
counsel nor defendants, however, could use the settlement funds to enrich
their preferred charities. Defendants would also be precluded from giving
money to themselves.
Paying all funds to identified victims does have limitations and drawbacks,
however. Most obvious, some legitimate victims of the defendant will not
receive compensation.289 Primarily, it does little to eliminate the general
incentives for collusion and rent seeking by defendants and class counsel,
as both will still wish for the class to be large and the per-claim amount
to be low. Counsel can still justify a higher fee award, and defendants
will still obtain release from legal liability. In most meaningful respects,
this solution would return us to the pre-cy pres world—an improvement,
but not a solution.
There is one way this solution might create new incentives for rent
seeking among named plaintiffs. Rather than receiving a flat rate for their
participation as named plaintiffs, those individuals would now capture the
remainder of the settlement value and might encourage even less notice to
absent class members or a more complicated application process, so the
remainder is maximized.
2. Presumptive Reduction of Attorney’s Fees
Another suggestion for reform is that courts award attorneys a lower
percentage of the award in cases with cy pres settlements.290 The justification
for this reform is that payments to third parties are of lesser value to
the class than actual compensation, and class counsel should bear a greater
burden of proof when the alleged benefit to the class is indirect.291 Similar
reforms have been applied to coupon settlements, where the benefit to the
class is also indirect.292

288. See Wasserman, supra note 127, at 111.
289. See Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 2, at 620.
290. Wasserman, supra note 127, at 137. See generally Redish, supra note 77, at 469–
71 (proposing that class counsel compensation be based solely on actual class member
compensation).
291. Cf. Redish, supra note 77, at 473 (finding no justification for cy pres).
292. Wasserman, supra note 127, at 137–40.
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This proposal fails to eliminate—or even reduce—the philanthropic
benefit that defendants and class counsel derive from cy pres awards or
the appearance of corruption of judges. Therefore, it fails to reduce the
rent seeking at the heart of the problem with cy pres settlements. It might
offer a marginal reduction in the incentive to collude, but only because
class counsel must push for larger total settlements to justify a higher dollar
amount in fee awards. Defendants will be reluctant to accept that outcome,
so class counsel must offer some additional concession, perhaps turning
more of the power to choose award recipients over to the defendant. This
proposal would likely modify the process of collusion and the relative
balance of power, but not the occurrence of collusion.
3. Better Notice
Many opportunities for rent seeking in class actions arise from the
meager notice requirements to class members.293 Class actions involving
cy pres awards might therefore be made subject to greater scrutiny
regarding notice given to the class.294 Better notice requirements might
enable class members to know their status as a member of a class, but it
does little for their incentives to be involved. Better notice may be a
necessary condition for solving the incentives problem in class actions,
but it is far from a sufficient condition. This proposal will have little to
no effect on the ability of the class to effectively monitor class counsel,
and it is unlikely that any changes to notice requirements will change the
level of rent seeking in cases where cy pres settlements are at play. However,
there are more general benefits to be derived from this reform, as class
counsel have incentives to provide only the minimum notice, so the class
is unaware and non-disruptive of the goals class counsel wishes to achieve.295
Although it would do little to minimize rent seeking, this reform would
still benefit class members.
4. Devil’s Advocate
Implementation of a Devil’s Advocate system, in which the court would
appoint an individual to scrutinize any settlement, has also been suggested

293.
294.
295.

See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
See Wasserman, supra note 127, at 147–54.
See id. at 154–55.
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to combat self-dealing and collusion.296 This proposal relies on the threat
of detection to curb bad behavior,297 but it is not clear how appointment
of yet another monitor would eliminate what existing monitors—attorneys,
judges, and class counsel—have failed to curb. A more likely outcome is
that the Devil’s Advocate would become another focal point for rentseeking expenditures, eventually being captured by one of the colluding
parties.298 Even if the Devil’s Advocate performed assigned responsibilities
with the utmost integrity, the courts would still be required to acknowledge
the Advocate’s findings and act on them. Given the evidence that courts
have ignored regarding collusion and self-dealing under the regime,299 it
is unclear why they would recognize it when presented by a Devil’s Advocate.
5. Opt-In Cy Pres
The dangers of class actions, generally, and specifically, those involving
cy pres awards, are exacerbated by our operating an opt-out class action
regime.300 Class members rarely know they are class members and never
have effective control over their counsel. While it would not solve all
problems with class actions, reversing its previous course and requiring
that all class actions—or at least those involving a cy pres settlement—be
opt-in would eliminate many opportunities for collusion and rent seeking.301
Creating a class through an opt-in mechanism would be more costly, limiting
the size of the class and making each class voice more meaningful.302
More important, each member of the class must affirmatively join the class,
which would increase the salience of the class action to each class member.
Small class size and greater involvement will not directly affect the
incentives for collusion and self-dealing by class counsel and defendants,
but they affect the analysis in two important ways. First, that individuals
have affirmatively chosen to become part of the class, including choosing
the attorneys who will represent them, weakens the argument that class
members are being exploited. The one exception would be if the attorney
fell demonstrably short of professional standards, but short of legal malpractice,
courts would not need to police class counsel as closely because class
296. See id. at 154–57.
297. Optimal deterrence models posit a positive correlation between the probability
of detection and the level of deterrence. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy
and the Social Cost of Monopoly, 78 IOWA L. REV. 371, 374–76 (1993).
298. See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Capture, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1543, 1552–63 (2018)
(describing the theory of regulatory capture).
299. See supra Sections IV.A.-B.
300. See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
301. See John Bronsteen, Class Action Settlements: An Opt-In Proposal, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV. 903, 906 (2005).
302. See id. at 906–07.
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members would have accepted the outcome by opting in and, possibly,
failing to further police counsel.
Perhaps less obvious, an opt-in mechanism for class formation would
increase competition in class formation, requiring class counsel to compete
against other potential counsel for class members’ participation.303
Competition typically occurs along at least two criteria—quality and
price.304 Price competition would occur in terms of the percentage of the
final award that a prospective class counsel would take in attorney fees.305
Quality competition could occur in a variety of ways but should at least
include the level of input from each class member that class members demand
and, most importantly, the compensation received. 306 Each prospective
class counsel would be attempting to put together a package of price and
quality measures that would entice sufficient plaintiffs to affirmatively
join the class. Even with no other regulation, this should lead to better
policing of abusive attorney’s fees and collusive rent seeking than courts
have been able to achieve.
Notice this would not necessarily eliminate forms of compensation that
appear abusive in our regime. Coupon settlements often leave most class
members with no compensation because the vast majority of the class will
never use them.307 Cy pres settlements are abusive because they give away
the property of the class to third parties with only a hope that some benefit
might drift back to the class.308 In both cases, the perception of these practices
as abusive arises, absent class members not having approved of a settlement
that appears to provide no benefit. That which is abusive without consent
becomes acceptable when consent is given.
It is not impossible, however, to craft a scenario where class members,
if individually asked, would unanimously agree to a coupon settlement or
a cy pres settlement. The former might be approved by the class because
they all intend to purchase the defendant’s products. The latter might be
approved because they all receive sufficient psychic benefit from the specific
charity receiving the aggregate compensation. Approval by the class would
303. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 423.
304. Kidd, supra note 8, at 1257 (“[C]ompetitive markets typically provide[]improved
quality and prices.”).
305. See Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation:
Is it Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65, 105 (2003).
306. See id. at 93.
307. It was for this reason that the Class Action Fairness Act requires valuation of a
coupon settlement to be based on the coupons actually redeemed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a)–(c).
308. See supra Section III.B.
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require class input into designating the cy pres recipients. More generally,
a class comprised of those who have affirmatively chosen to be part of a
class will be better positioned to police the behavior of class counsel and
reduce self-dealing and collusion with the defendant.
B. Replacement Proposals
If cy pres awards are eliminated from class actions—either by the
Supreme Court or through legislative action—there will be low-value,
high-volume cases not easily facilitated through the normal class action
process.309 Cy pres awards provide an alternative, but not the only one.
What follows are possible replacements for cy pres awards. Each alternative
could be useful in particular circumstances, even if it is not applicable to
all low-value, high-volume cases.
1. Dismiss the Claims
Often, the supposed harm to the class exists only on paper, in that a
statute defines it as a harm.310 These cases often have no detailed records
of victims; they are often only vaguely defined by the categories of people
who have taken a general action—such as entering a Google search—
sometime within a defined time period.311 In these cases, it may be difficult
to identify not only the individuals who compose the class but also what
harm they may have suffered.312 If the settlement amount is sufficiently
low that there is no feasible way to administer any compensation to the
class members, and if the claims are relatively weak, courts should simply
dismiss the entire action for lack of standing.313 This does eliminate the
deterrence benefits, but if we must look so hard for a cognizable injury,
then it is not unreasonable to conclude there is no future harm to deter.
This solution would reduce some incentives for collusion in marginal
cases. If class counsel and defendants conspire to increase the size of the

309. See supra Section II.A.
310. E.g., Corbello v. Jefferson Davis Par. Police Jury, 262 So. 2d 151, 152 (La. Ct.
App. 1972) (“Contracts entered into in violation of LSA–R.S. 38:2211 et seq., which are
not inherently immoral or evil, are, in the absence of fraud, only malum prohibitum.”).
311. E.g., Frank, 139 S. Ct. at 1044. When commentators in a modern, technological
age admit that “many class members cannot be located,” Bartholomew, supra note 133, at
3248, one begins to suspect that they may never have existed in the first place. If so, the
claims have no business being entertained by the courts. See supra Section III.C.3.
312. See supra Section III.C.3.
313. In fact, the Court’s recent decision in Frank v. Gaos suggests that the court has
the same concern over standing. See Frank, 139 S. Ct. at 1045–46. Redish, Julian, and
Zyontz make a similar argument that a class action that is unmanageable without cy pres
could be denied class action status. Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 2, at 639–40.
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class,314 they would be moving ever closer to those claims for which there
is only de minimis harm. By so doing, they would be decreasing the perclaim amount and making it more likely that the litigation would be dismissed.
2. Reversion
Sometimes, it might be desirable to return the settlement money to the
defendant. Returning unclaimed funds to the party liable for the harm
might seem counterintuitive; it would also reduce any deterrence benefit
from the litigation.315 Sometimes, however, overdeterrence might be of
greater concern than underdeterrence, such as when no substantive harm
has been imposed on class members.316 In such a case, there may be no
future harm to deter, no additional class members to compensate, and the
size of the claims may be overstated.
By allowing any remaining funds to revert to the defendant, neither
class counsel nor defendants could obtain any reputational advantage from
the bestowal of cy pres funds on third party organizations. That would
diminish some incentives for collusion, but not all. For example, it would
do little to diminish the incentive for class counsel to inflate the size of
the class since attorney’s fees will be judged at settlement, not when any
remaining funds need to be disposed of.317 Also, defendants will see
nothing amiss in increasing the size of the class and might even engage in
greater expansion, knowing they will receive the reversion. While reversion
eliminates the additional incentives for collusion that arise from cy pres
awards, it does little to curb the incentives that arise naturally out of more
traditional class actions.
3. Escheat to the State
One potential solution is to have unclaimed settlement money go, or
escheat, to the state. This idea is not new,318 and the law already allows

314. See supra Section II.2.
315. See Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 2, at 638–39.
316. E.g., Movitz v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 148 F.3d 760, 763 (1998) (“To hold
the defendant liable for the loss would produce overdeterrence by making him an insurer
against conditions outside his control.”).
317. See supra Section III.D.1.
318. See, e.g., Hodgson v. YB Quezada, 498 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1974); Six (6)
Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1990).
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for this process.319 The law deals with monies paid to courts for any pending
case or adjudication.320 Any money that remains unclaimed for five years
is paid to the United States Government.321 The law also allows for persons
with a rightful claim to the money to petition for payment after the money
has been paid to the government.322
This solution has several benefits. First, it maintains the deterrence that
is an express goal of litigation.323 If there are strong reasons to believe
there were actual harms caused, notwithstanding the lack of identifiable
victims, then there may be value in making the defendant pay for its
mistakes, even if the funds do not go directly to the victims. Additionally,
employing an escheatment remedy reduces the incentive for a defendant
to collude in creating a cy pres settlement; there is no reputational benefit
from giving away funds that belong to the class, and the defendant will
receive no remaining funds. Also, any plaintiff entitled to relief will retain
a claim to their compensation under the statute and can petition for those
funds from the government,324 something impossible to imagine if the
money has been given to a cy pres recipient. Lastly, judges will no longer
be tempted by prospective donations to their alma mater or other related
entities.
Though the incentives to collude are reduced, they are not eliminated.
There will be fewer cy pres abuses without the reputational benefits of class
counsel and defendants donating the class’s property to charity. Defendant’s
incentives to collude will be further reduced by not being able to recover
excess funds. Nevertheless, the defendant and class counsel still have
incentives to collude to increase the size of the class.325 Once again,
escheatment would be a useful tool in reducing the extra cy pres-related
incentives to collude but would do little to reduce the standard perverse
incentives in class actions, generally.
4. Quasi Qui Tam
In some cases—specifically, those with de minimis harms but a strong
social harm that deserves redress—the goals of those applying cy pres
doctrines to class actions might be better achieved through a form of recovery
akin to a qui tam suit. Qui tam suits in the United States find origin in the
False Claims Act, which was passed to encourage whistleblowing on
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
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§ 2042.
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§ 2042.
See infra notes 59–63 and accompanying text.

58-3_KIDD&WHITEHEAD_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 58: 579, 2021]

10/11/2021 9:13 AM

Saving Class Members from Counsel
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

fraudulent suppliers of Union troops in the Civil War.326 The False Claims
Act allows a private citizen to sue on behalf of, and in the name of, the
United States Government.327 The suit is filed in camera and under seal
for sixty days before being served on the defendant.328 The Government
may litigate the claim itself, allow the private citizen to litigate the claim,
or dismiss the claim subject to court approval.329
Crafting a similar method for prosecution of aggregate claims would
not necessarily diminish the incentives for collusion between class counsel
and defendants, but it would provide for a single plaintiff who would have
stronger incentives to maximize total payout and police attempted selfdealing by counsel.330 In many class actions, the per-plaintiff recovery
will always be low, which gives effectively zero incentive for any plaintiff
to sue.331 Allowing aggregation of those harms into a single class action
allows for the harms to be redressed, from a societal perspective, but it gives
rise to the principal-agent problems that plague class actions.332 The use
of a qui tam approach recognizes that, sometimes, society is concerned not
with individual harm, but rather the aggregate societal cost.333
When a single individual is responsible for the litigation, class counsel
could not as easily hide self-dealing. Similarly, because the qui tam plaintiff
would receive some proportion of the entire award—possibly with the
remainder escheating to the state334—the plaintiff would have far greater
incentive to maximize the award than a named plaintiff in standard class
actions, who will receive a flat fee.335 Class counsel would therefore be
326. Erickson ex rel. United States v. Am. Inst. of Biological Scis., 716 F. Supp. 908,
915 (E.D. Va. 1989).
327. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).
328. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
329. Id. § 3730(b).
330. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 108–10 (1991). In either case, a single plaintiff would have
the proper incentives to maximize payout and, important to this analysis, object to abusive
or collusive settlements. Agency Costs, supra note 25, at 427 nn.358–59.
331. See supra Section II.1.
332. See supra Section II.2.
333. See, e.g., Beverly Cohen, Kaboom! The Explosion of Qui Tam False Claims
Under the Health Reform Law, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 77, 80–81 (2011) (describing the
intent of qui tam claims in the wake of the Civil War to cut down on fraudulent claims on
the government and the resulting unnecessary expenditure of taxpayer funds).
334. See supra Section V.B.3.
335. Cf. In re Akorn, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 15 C 1994, 2018 WL 2688877, at *4 (N.D.
Ill. June 5, 2018) (“[B]ecause the attorney’s percentage of the settlement fund decreases
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far less likely to get away with certain classic schemes, such as selling the
class claims for pennies on the dollar.
There could still be some unwarranted expansion of the class, as class
counsel and the qui tam plaintiff would both benefit from an increased
award, but the defendant’s incentives are more complicated. The defendant
would still like to dispose of a large number of claims, but that incentive
is diminished by the fact that a qui tam plaintiff will be more likely to
demand that the defendant fully pay damages, rather than a fraction of their
value.336 Under a standard class action, the collusion is likely to maximize
the total number of claims, subject to a fixed payout. Under a qui tam
regime, that is still possible, but the plaintiff’s receiving a portion of every
additional dollar of claim reduces the likelihood somewhat.
There are several problems with this possibility, however. The first has
arisen in traditional qui tam suits under the False Claims Act—the incentive
for plaintiffs to bring claims based not on newly discovered fraud but publicly
available information.337 In these cases, “parasitic” informers338 do not
generate the expected qui tam benefits. Courts have had trouble distinguishing
between “honest” and “parasitic” informers,339 and similar difficulties might
arise in determining whether a qui tam aggregate litigation plaintiff
is generating the benefits that the procedure was designed to generate.
Standard requirements as to standing would seem to mitigate this concern
somewhat, by requiring the plaintiff to be a member of the class harmed
or a person with standing to represent those harmed.
Another concern with this proposal is that it does not, by itself, eliminate
the threat of cy pres awards. Because there is only one plaintiff, class
counsel could easily obtain consent from that individual to award part, or
all, of the judgment to a charitable cause. Class counsel might prefer this
outcome to government escheatment, given that class counsel can then
obtain greater total benefit from the case than just attorney’s fees.340 This
situation differs from an opt-in class that approves of a cy pres award. In
an opt-in class, a cy pres award will reflect the unanimous judgment of the
victims as to the best use of the judgment award.341 In a qui tam scenario,

with the size of the recovery, the sliding scale will always marginally decrease the incentive to
reject an inadequate settlement and fight for a larger recovery.” (emphasis added)).
336. Because a relator who brings a qui tam action receives a percentage of the total
amount recovered, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d), a relator seeking to maximize net returns will
maximize the total judgment.
337. See Virginia C. Theis, Government Employees As Qui Tam Plaintiffs: Subverting
the Purposes of the False Claims Act, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 225, 228 (1999).
338. Id.
339. Id. at 231.
340. See supra Section III.D.1.
341. See supra Section V.A.5.
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the interests of the victims have been subsumed into the aggregate societal
interests, so any use of funds not awarded to the qui tam plaintiff should
reflect societal interests, not the interests of the qui tam plaintiff, class
counsel, and defendant.342
5. Can Corporate Governance Supply a Solution?
One final solution might be to harness the insights of corporate governance
to solve the class action problem. Corporate governance is another area
rife with principal-agent problems,343 and those forms crafted over centuries
might have something to say about solving them.344 One specific example
imposes fiduciary duties on corporate agents, bringing agents’ interests in
line with their corporate principal.345 For several years, Dutch law has at
least partially reflected this theoretical construct, requiring the formation
of an association to sue on behalf of a class. 346 In the United States,
Professor Amanda Rose has also argued for using the corporate form to
fix our class action system.347 This section will discuss both options to
determine if they have the potential to remediate the problems with our
class action system—with or without cy pres awards.
a. Do as the Dutch Do?
The Dutch system has limitations that would seem strange to practitioners
in the class action bar. For example, in the Dutch system, an association
bringing a claim on behalf of a class cannot claim damages,348 so it appears
more like the group litigation that is the evolutionary forebearer of our

342. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 333, at 77, 80–81 (describing the societal purposes
motivating qui tam lawsuits).
343. Andrei Schleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52
J. FIN. 737, 740–48 (1997).
344. See generally Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 51 (1977) (describing how common law rules, arising slowly through repetitive trial
in the realities of life, are more efficient); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and
the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977) (describing why and how
common law judges are more likely to choose efficient rules).
345. E.g., Stephen J. Lubben, The Board’s Duty to Keep its Options Open, 2015 U.
ILL. L. REV. 817, 828 (2015) (“It is widely accepted that fiduciary duties exist to align the
board’s incentives with the firm’s.”).
346. See Art. 3:305a para. 1 BW (Neth.).
347. Agency Costs, supra note 25.
348. Art. 3:305a para. 3 BW (Neth.).
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modern class action.349 Members of the class also may opt out.350 The
association form serves as the vehicle for establishing liability through the
equivalent of a declaratory judgment.351 Once liability has been established,
members of the class now have a binding finding of liability and can seek
damages individually or as a collective settlement under The Dutch Act
on the Collective Settlement of Mass Claims (WCAM).352
By itself, the Dutch system offers little to the U.S. class action regime.
It is still an opt-out system, so the vast majority of the class would not know
they were part of a class.353 It is potentially important that the individual
nature of the claimants’ legal rights is maintained throughout, but use of
the WCAM complicates things since it allows parties to a settlement to
file a petition to the Amsterdam Court of Appeals to have the settlement
declared legally binding on all class members.354 The combination of an
opt-out system with the ability to bind all class members renders the Dutch
emphasis on individual rights as ephemeral as the U.S. due process protections
for absent class members under the regime.355
Nevertheless, the Dutch concept could be modified and applied in U.S.
courts in ways that could yield significant improvements in our class action
regime. For example, while these Dutch associations resemble American
incorporated entities—a board of directors empowered to represent and
act on behalf of the association and, indirectly, its dispersed membership356
—there is no express duty of loyalty imposed on the directors. 357 The
board of directors can bring claims on behalf of the members, so long as
that power is referenced in the articles of incorporation,358 but self-dealing by
the board does not have a specific remedy.359 Dutch directors are therefore
relatively free to pursue their own interests, like class counsel and
defendants in the U.S. class action context.

349. See supra notes 72–77 and accompanying text.
350. Art. 3:305a para. 5 BW (Neth.).
351. See id. para. 3.
352. The acronym stems from the Dutch title of the Act, “Wet Collective Afwikkeling
Massaschade.” See Karen Jelsma & Manon Cordewener, The Settlement of Mass Claims:
A Hot Topic in the Netherlands, INT’L L. Q., Summer 2011, at 13, 13–14.
353. See supra Section II.2.
354. See Art. 7:907 BW (Neth.); Jelsma & Cordewener, supra note 352, at 13–14.
355. E.g., supra notes 199–204 and accompanying text.
356. Cf. Bart Krans, The Dutch Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Damages, 27
PAC. MCGEORGE GLOB. BUS. & DEV. L.J. 281, 291 (2014) (describing the duties owed by
the association to the represented parties).
357. J. van Bekkum et al., Corporate Governance in the Netherlands, ELEC. J. COMPAR.
L., Dec. 2010, at 1, 7.
358. Art. 1014 Rv (Neth.).
359. See van Bekkum et al., supra note 357, at 8–9. Dutch directors may not be
sued, directly or derivatively, by shareholders. Id. at 8.
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The duty of loyalty, in the U.S. corporate context, is one of the primary
tools for aligning the interests of shareholders and managers,360 with managers
—the agents—being bound by a strict duty to look after the interests of
the corporation—the principal—and, indirectly, the shareholders.361 If an
associational form were adopted for U.S. class actions, fiduciary duties—
particularly the duty of loyalty—could align the interests of class members
and counsel. The duty of loyalty has not eliminated self-dealing by U.S.
corporate directors, but it does provide shareholders a way to force judicial
scrutiny of managerial actions.362 An analogue in the class action space—
the ability of absent class members to sue for disgorgement of profits by
class counsel and, potentially, class representatives—could provide meaningful
judicial scrutiny of class action settlements.
An adapted Dutch system could require formation of a formal association.
That association would be governed by a board of directors, comprised of
class counsel and class representatives. The association, guided by the
board of directors, would proceed with the class action as usual, but any class
member who wished to challenge the litigation or a resulting settlement
would have access to more than the objection procedures under Rule 23.
For example, if a class member believed that attorney’s fees were too
high, it could file a claim, alleging that members of the board of directors
had used their position of trust to enrich themselves.363 Similarly, if a
class member believed that the board had sold the assets of the association
—the legal claims of the class members—for too little, they could file a
claim, alleging either that the board members had done so to enrich
themselves—breach of the duty of loyalty—or that they have failed to act
reasonably—breach of the duty of care. With a cy pres or cy pres-only
settlement, the proceeds from the sale of association assets will have been
given away to a third party, albeit a charitable one, making the fiduciary
claims arguably easier.364
360. See Lubben, supra note 345, at 828.
361. E.g., Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
362. See Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
363. See Guth, 5 A.2d at 510. The exception to this rule would be if attorney’s fees
were viewed as executive compensation because “a board’s decision on executive
compensation is entitled to great deference.” Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del.
2000). The law could ease this ambiguity by clarifying that fee awards are a side-deal,
rather than executive compensation.
364. Corporate boards have some flexibility to contribute to charitable causes, A.P.
Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 589–90 (N.J. 1953), but the purpose of a corporation
remains maximizing shareholder value, and that purpose may not be abandoned, Dodge v.
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This associational form for class actions is not that far removed from
the current regime. Class counsel’s role of directing litigation closely mirrors
that of directors, albeit without enforceable fiduciary duties. The class
action aggregates the assets of all class members and a court’s designation
of class counsel operates as an election of those who will act on behalf of
the beneficial owners of the assets. Most litigation decisions are then left
to the discretion of the class counsel, subject only to often-cursory review
by the courts.365 Embracing the similarities and locating class action lawsuits
under corporate law would impose the fiduciary duties seen as vital to
protecting the interests of shareholders from board discretion and could
be just as vital to protecting the class from counsel.366
A functional class action system based on the Dutch model would need
one additional modification—the ability of the association to control
litigation—and be governed by fiduciary duties—for determinations of liability
and damages. The primary locus of rent-seeking behavior in the U.S. class
action system is in the damages phase, not establishment of liability.367 The
duty of loyalty can better align the incentives of class counsel with the
class, but only if the associational form is required for both phases of
litigation. Combined with imposing fiduciary duties, a modified Dutch system
would create strong anti-rent-seeking pressures on class counsel, knowing
that class members have a meaningful remedy. This solution draws from
an existing and relatively stable body of law—corporate law—rather than
creating something out of whole cloth.

Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). Cy pres awards, and particularly cy
pres-only awards, look less like an “incidental humanitarian expenditure,” id., and far
more like transfer of wealth.
365. The business judgment rule grants significant deference to corporate boards in
the absence of self-dealing, establishing “a presumption that in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Boland v. Boland,
31 A.3d 529, 548 (Md. 2011). Court review o f class action settlements seems to adopt
a similar presumption. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class
Action Settlements, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 167, 176 (2009).
366. Various commentators have understood that there is a need for some oversight
mechanism, beyond judicial review under Rule 23, to improve the alignment of incentives
between class and counsel, and many of them have sounded in corporate law. E.g., Coffee,
supra note 3; Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for
Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25 (2002); Charles Silver & Sam Dinkin,
Incentivizing Institutional Investors to Serve as Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Fraud Class
Actions, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 471 (2008). It is therefore surprising that none have emphasized
the potential for fiduciary duties to fill that role.
367. A large majority of class action lawsuits settle before trial, where liability would
be established. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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b. Seeing the Problem Through Rose-Colored Solutions
The parallels between a public corporation and class actions have been
noticed by many commentators in the past.368 Professor Rose has provided a
recent analysis and identifies several potential analogues from the corporate
realm that could aid in curbing abuses inherent in our current class action
regime.369 Rose stops short of advocating the adoption of a Dutch associationalform requirement, but proposes several individual reforms 370 which seek
to constrain bad behavior by class counsel and defendants. As a preliminary
matter, the reforms proposed by Rose are innovations within a larger debate
about how to establish meaningful constraints. This Article references
Rose’s work both for its own merit and as a representation of the evolving
thought.
This area of scholarship recognizes the potential for abuse by class
counsel.371 It also recognizes that, in many cases, using class counsel to
achieve ex-post remediation of harms is preferable to “ex ante regulation
or large government enforcement agencies vulnerable to capture and
complacency.”372 Careful analysis also reveals that there are significant
transaction costs associated with aggregate litigation, 373 and Rose has
proposed to mitigate those costs with a national class action database—
and “supporting administration” within the Department of Justice—dubbed
Classaction.gov.374 The database and administration would provide a central
repository of information about class actions to allow “track[ing of] potential
class members and provid[ing] an efficient method for identifying and
communicating with them.”375 Doing so would reduce the costs of notice
and claims processing376 and would facilitate the free transfer of claims.377

368. See supra note 366.
369. See Agency Costs, supra note 25, at 339–49.
370. See id. at 401–30.
371. E.g., Redish, supra note 77, at 465–66.
372. Classaction.gov, supra note 25, at 487–88. See generally BRIAN T. FITZPATRICK,
THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR CLASS ACTIONS (2019) (describing how class action lawsuits
resolve broad social problems without heavy-handed regulations).
373. E.g., Classaction.gov, supra note 25, at 489–92 (describing how a national
database would improve trust and reduce “information processing costs,” “claims processing
costs,” and “verification costs”).
374. Id. at 491.
375. Agency Costs, supra note 25, at 401.
376. Id. at 403.
377. See infra note 383 and accompanying text.
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An innovative proposal such as this deserves greater depth of analysis
than is possible in this setting, but a few cautionary comments should be
made. First, the ability of a federal class action database to reduce
transaction costs does a lot of work in Rose’s proposals, so its viability is
key. Second, centering the database in the government exposes the proposal
to rent seeking, corruption, and the possibility of capture.378 Third, even
if those distorting forces were not present, it is practically impossible to
build a perfect database, so some effectiveness will be lost. None of that
means that Rose’s proposals do not have potential to curb class action abuses,
but any judgment on that potential should be discounted to account for
departures from the ideal.379
Building on the national database and regulatory agency, Rose proposes:
(1) appointment of a class “overseer,” who would function as trustee for
the class and serve as a check on class counsel; 380 (2) encouragement of
third-party “reputational intermediaries” who could more credibly object
to abuses by class counsel;381 (3) establishment of attorney’s fees up-front,
with a sliding scale to better align the incentives of class with counsel;382
and (4) allowance and facilitation of free transferability of claims between
class members.383 Each proposal has a specific analogue to corporate law
although the strength of the analogy varies, depending on the proposal.
Seeking to recreate the corporate board and management, the class overseer
position could police class counsel by being responsible for litigation decisions
on behalf of the class.384 Although Rose calls the position a “trusteeship
position,”385 she does not discuss the application of fiduciary duties.386
Instead, she argues for other constraints on the overseer’s actions, such as

378. See generally David R. Henderson, Rent Seeking, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY
(2008), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/RentSeeking.html [https://perma.cc/C8VVZRBK] (explaining why government’s ability to bestow special benefits draws individuals
seeking those benefits); François Melese, Corruption, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY (2008),
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Corruption.html [https://perma.cc/C8VV-ZRBK] (describing
the dangers and costs of government officials abusing their position for personal gain).
379. Of course, every policy choice must be implemented in the real world, with all
its flaws, and so will function at less-than-ideal capacity. Simpler proposals are often preferable,
due to the lower number of friction points that can give rise to deviations from the ideal.
380. Agency Costs, supra note 25, at 345–46.
381. Id. at 411.
382. Id. at 414–15.
383. Id. at 346, 423.
384. Id. at 405.
385. Id. at 404.
386. Rose argues that being elected by class members will make the overseer loyal
to the class, id. at 405 (“Ideally, candidates for the position would be elected by class
members via a class member vote. This would legitimize the overseer and tie its allegiance
to the class . . . .”), but it is not clear why, absent fiduciary duties, that would be the case.
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requiring that the overseer be selected through a class election,387 rather
than by counsel. 388 Further channeling the spirit of corporate boards
everywhere, Rose argues for the equivalent of independent directorship,
prohibiting the overseer from having ties to class counsel or defendant389
and encouraging individuals from outside the class to enter the contest to
be overseer.
Next, Rose applies the concept of institutional investors to the class
action context by arguing that third-party intermediaries could be better at
policing class counsel’s actions.390 There are no large “investors” in a class
action context,391 so Rose suggests turning to government actors and nonprofits
for input on the case. 392 Class counsel could seek input from related
government agencies, and, if the agency approves of the settlement, the
level of judicial scrutiny would be lowered.393 If the government agency
declines to comment on the settlement, the court could appoint a third
party as guardian ad litem for the class, with similar adjustments to the
level of judicial scrutiny, should the guardian approve of the settlement.394
Third, Rose proposes to model class counsel compensation on corporate
manager compensation, using ex ante agreement and performance-based
compensation.395 By setting compensation ahead of performance, the incentives
presented by the compensation scheme can be properly considered.396
The incentive to benefit the class can be increased by establishing a sliding
scale for class counsel’s contingency fee, raising the fee according to

387. Id. Apart from asserting that the federal class action database would facilitate
a class election, see id., it is not clear how the election would take place, nor is it clear how
class member apathy, see supra Section II.B., as well as in Rose’s own work, id. at 346,
350, would be overcome. Elections are often rent-seeking contests, particularly when the
victor gains power over funds or individuals. Rose proposes banning “pay to play” arrangements,
id. at 406, but informal arrangements could easily arise. Those arrangements could be
policed, but the requirement of doing so would increase the overall cost of the regime.
388. Agency Costs, supra note 25, at 405.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 411.
391. Except to the extent that Rose’s final proposal—allowing alienation of claims—
were adopted. See infra notes 399–401 and accompanying text.
392. Agency Costs, supra note 25, at 411.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 411–12. By expressly inviting third parties to become directly involved
in the case, this proposal will lead to greater judicial rent seeking, as interested parties clamor
to be appointed as the guardian.
395. Id. at 414–15.
396. See id.
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factors like duration or total award obtained for the class.397 Class counsel,
like corporate managers, will attempt to get around any obstacles to their
fee recovery,398 but this proposal should be an improvement to the general
incentive for class counsel to collude with the defendant and sell class
claims for pennies on the dollar.
Finally, Rose argues that allowing free transferability of claims would
lead to aggregation of class interests in one or more individuals, each of
whom would have a stronger incentive to police class counsel and maximize
class payout.399 This proposal offers a solution similar to the qui tam solution,
discussed supra,400 but for a broader class of claims. The goal would
be to create a class action equivalent of an institutional investor that would
have greater incentives to police management than a mere shareholder.401
The analogy is weakened by shareholders knowing they own stock, while
class members rarely know they have a legal claim tied up in a class action.
However, the opportunity to amass a large stake in a class action should
provide incentives for knowledgeable plaintiffs to find the remaining
shareholders and obtain their consent.
Rose proposes to limit transferability of shares to members of the
class,402 but it is not clear why this limitation is necessary. If the purpose
is to generate the equivalent of institutional shareholders and their better
incentives to maximize returns, then we should want broad participation
in the market. Prohibiting participation by third parties could avoid some
judicial rent seeking, unrelated to the merits of the class claims, 403 but it
would eliminate some competition from individuals far better situated to
pursue the legal claims.404 If a defendant bought all the claims, then that
397. Id. at 415–16.
398. Id. For a discussion of efforts by corporate managers to do the same, see Sanjai
Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to
the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REGUL. 359, 367–68 (2009) and Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse
M. Fried, How to Tie Equity Compensation to Long-Term Results, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN.,
Winter 2010, at 99, 105.
399. Agency Costs, supra note 25, at 423–24.
400. See supra Section V.B.4.
401. Agency Costs, supra note 25, at 423.
402. See id. In this, Rose diverges from the proposal of Korsmo and Meyers, see
Agency Costs, supra note 25, at 428 (citing Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Aggregation
by Acquisition: Replacing Class Actions with a Market for Legal Claims, 101 IOWA L.
REV. 1323, 1359 (2016)), which would allow full alienation of claims without restriction.
403. See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text.
404. As long as there is sufficient aggregation of claims to an individual claimant,
the benefits of this proposal would begin to be achieved. As aggregation of clai ms
approaches unity—a single claimant holding the right to all legal claims—the situation
would approximate the solution proposed by Macey and Miller. See Macey & Miller,
supra note 330, at 106–07 (proposing that certain class actions be sold, as an aggregate
claim, to the highest bidder).
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defendant would have paid each class member what the class member
would accept in compensation—the ideal outcome that a class action
should be seeking to effectuate. If class counsel bought all the claims, it
would then have an incentive to maximize the net payout of the claim and
would likely pursue a higher level of damages than under our regime.
Overall, Rose’s solutions, like those that preceded them, aim at the general
perverse incentives that plague class actions. The increased complexity
of Rose’s proposals makes them both more likely to address specific issues
but less likely to be capable of implementation in an efficient and effective
manner. More to the point of this research, they appear to do nothing to
address the particular scourge of cy pres settlements. Lastly, in applying
corporate law to class action abuses, it is odd that Rose ignores the potential
benefits of applying the duty of loyalty.
C. Coexistence of Remedies
Choosing a solution might prove difficult, but the courts need not consider
each remedy in isolation. Courts should view these and other potential
reforms as tools that they can use to protect the interests of class members,
particularly from the collusion of their legal representatives. A court might
find that, given the circumstances, one solution is preferred; in another
case, the same court might conclude that two or more of these solutions
are needed to protect the class.
The court should always begin with an analysis of whether the plaintiff
has standing to sue.405 If the claims are de minimis, the court might conclude
there is no standing and dismiss the case.406 If the social goals are sufficiently
strong, the court could reject class action status but allow a qui tam
plaintiff to proceed with the claim.407 If standing is found, the court would
then proceed down one of two tracks, depending on whether the class had
been created through an opt-in or an opt-out procedure. If the former,
great deference could be given to any settlement; if the latter, the court
should view the actions of class counsel with skepticism, knowing that the
interests of class counsel are not aligned with the class. Class counsel
who wish to avoid the skeptical scrutiny that comes with an opt-out class
405. Cf. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 558 (1992) (“The preliminary
issue, and the only one we reach, is whether respondents here, plaintiffs below, have
standing to seek judicial review of the rule.”).
406. See supra Section V.B.1.
407. See supra Section V.B.4.
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could form an association, subjecting themselves to fiduciary duties and
accompanying penalties should they engage in careless or self-dealing
behavior.
When approving a settlement, any use of cy pres settlements should
be rejected, unless the class was formed by an opt-in procedure,408 class
counsel obtains unanimous consent from the class, or the claims have been
brought in an associational form. Even in those cases, the court should be
watchful for attempted self-dealing by class counsel, but the procedures
provide some protection, so the need for skeptical scrutiny is lessened. If
the settlement results in excess funds, the court would need to decide how
to dispose of them, and that requires judicial discretion. As a reminder, the
options available are pro-rata distribution to known victims,409 reversion
to the defendant,410 and escheatment to the state.411
Pro-rata distribution of the surplus could be the default, deterring the
defendant and compensating the victims. If that leads to overcompensation,
the court could choose reversion of the surplus, particularly if the
defendant’s actions were not malicious. The court would need to weigh
the need to incentivize a greater level of care in the future.412 If reversion
is not appropriate for either of those two reasons, the court could require
escheatment to the state, which would at least preserve the deterrent purposes
of class action litigation.413
The decision tree in play here is somewhat complicated, but legislation
—at the federal or state level—could provide more clarity by establishing
when the qui tam solution is appropriate or how a court should determine
how to dispose of a settlement surplus.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our class action regime is rife with principal-agent problems, and class
members desperately need protection from those they should be able to
trust—their lawyers. Class counsel and defendants have strong incentives
to collude and deprive class members of their legal rights for pennies on
the dollar. Many courts have abdicated their responsibility to protect the
interests of individual class members, and the trend is worsening with the

408. See supra Section V.A.5.
409. See supra Section V.A.1.
410. See supra Section V.B.2.
411. See supra Section V.B.3.
412. One situation where reversion might be appropriate is where the plaintiff’s
actions led to unforeseeable harm. E.g., Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 739 F.2d 730,
732 (2d Cir. 1984) (describing Boeing’s giving notice through two national newspapers,
later found not to be “reasonable notice”).
413. See supra Section V.B.3.

638

58-3_KIDD&WHITEHEAD_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 58: 579, 2021]

10/11/2021 9:13 AM

Saving Class Members from Counsel
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

increasing popularity of cy pres settlements. These settlements violate the
standards of Rule 23 and the First Amendment and due process rights of
the class. Cy pres settlements can also create conflicts of interest for
attorneys and judges that could violate ethical rules.
This Article has argued that cy pres awards should be largely prohibited
and has proposed several alternative solutions for cases in which cy pres
settlements are necessary—large classes with small per-member damages.
Prohibiting these awards would, admittedly, raise the cost of settlement
by removing a preferred option of class counsel and defendants. However,
because the real parties in interest are class members, not class counsel,
courts should view a decrease in abusive settlements as a feature, rather
than a bug. A higher cost of settlement might also lead to fewer class actions,
at least of the cy pres type, but many of those claims might represent a
lack of actual harm, so reducing them would lead to increased judicial
efficiency.
Reducing or eliminating cy pres settlements would also remove a temptation
for judges to edge into corruption by approving settlements to institutions
they favor. It also would remove a temptation for class counsel to bolster
their reputation by expropriating class members’ property. Defendants
might have the same incentives to push and pull at the edges, but without
a willing partner, the overall integrity of our judicial system would be
improved.
The Supreme Court could have partially resolved this issue in Frank but
instead remanded with a clear skepticism that the plaintiffs had standing.414
That decision could be a template for how courts deal with cy pres cases,415
but at least the Northern District of California seems determined to press
ahead with increased cy pres settlements.416 If the Supreme Court wishes
to avoid a wholesale corruption of the judicial process, it must clarify the
limits of cy pres in class actions and set guidelines for courts in resolving
class actions in ways that will preserve both the integrity of the system
and the rights of individual class members.
Cy pres has always been an awkward fit outside of its origins in equitable
distribution of wills and trusts.417 Importing it into class actions has led
414. See Frank, 139 S. Ct. at 1046.
415. See supra Section V.B.1.
416. See, e.g., In re Google L.L.C. St. View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., No. 10-MD02184-CRB, 2020 WL 1288377 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2020) (approving a cy pres-only
settlement after finding that the plaintiffs had standing).
417. See supra Section III.A.
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to the perverse result of class action lawsuits that enrich everyone but the
actual victims. It has created strong incentives for forum shopping and
the appearance of corruption among the judiciary. It has exacerbated the
existing incentives for collusion and self-dealing between defendants and
class counsel. The Supreme Court should take an appropriate case and
limit the use of cy pres soon. Legislatures can also play an important role,
crafting substitutes for the cy pres doctrine, such as those described above.
Whether those substitutes mirror a corporate form, a qui tam procedure,
or something else, the system cannot continue in this path, with perverse
incentives inflicting significant harm on class members.
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